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The Mobility Case for Regionalism
Nestor M. Davidson†* & Sheila R. Foster**
In the discourse of local government law, the idea that a mobile
populace can “vote with its feet” has long served as a justification for
devolution and decentralization. Tracing to Charles Tiebout’s seminal
work in public finance, the legal-structural prescription that follows is
that a diversity of independent and empowered local governments can best
satisfy the varied preferences of residents metaphorically shopping for
bundles of public services, regulatory environment, and tax burden.
This localist paradigm generally presumes that fragmented governments
are competing for residents within a given metropolitan area.
Contemporary patterns of mobility, however, call into question this
foundational assumption. People today move between — and not just
within — metropolitan regions, domestically and even internationally.
This is particularly so for a subset of residents — high human-capital
knowledge workers and the so-called “creative class” — that is
prominently coveted in this interregional competition. These modern
mobile residents tend to evaluate the policy bundles that drive their
locational decisions on a regional scale, weighing the comparative merits
of metropolitan areas against each other. And local governments are
increasingly recognizing that they need to work together at a regional
scale to compete for these residents.
This Article argues that this intermetropolitan mobility provides a novel
justification for regionalism that counterbalances the strong localist
tendency of the traditional Tieboutian view of local governance. Contrary
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to the predominant assumption in the legal literature, competition for
mobile residents is as much an argument for regionalism as it has been for
devolution and decentralization. In an era of global cities vying for talent,
the mobility case for regionalism has significant doctrinal consequences
for debates in local government law and public finance, including the
scope of local authority, the nature of regional equity, and the structure of
metropolitan collaboration.
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INTRODUCTION
A foundational concept in the discourse of local government law —
and federalism more broadly — is that a mobile populace will tend to
move to places that best reflect their preferences for the proffered mix
of local government services, regulatory environment, and tax burden.
This idea, which traces back to Charles Tiebout’s influential 1956
article on public finance, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,1 is
regularly invoked by legal scholars to argue for devolving authority to
decentralized local governments. In a quasi-marketplace of
metropolitan governance, the theory holds, a relatively greater variety
of local governments will tend to match better the preferences of what
Tiebout called “consumer-voters.”2 Local governments should thus be
empowered with relatively robust legal autonomy and even free to
secede from their metropolitan region.3
This model of residential sorting and its legal-structural implications
are predicated on a particular conception of mobility. On the demand
side of Tiebout’s metaphorical marketplace, people choose among
residential options in a given metropolitan area by evaluating the
bundle of public goods offered at the local level. Correspondingly, the
type of government the model contemplates to supply this targeted
bundle is paradigmatically a local government of general jurisdiction.4
1
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956).
2
Id. at 417-18. For an overview of the reception of mobility theory in local government
legal scholarship, see Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II — Localism and Legal Theory,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 399-435 (1989) [hereinafter Our Localism]. For Tiebout’s influence
on the broader discourse of federalism, see Todd E. Pettys, The Mobility Paradox, 92 GEO.
L.J. 481, 481 (2003) (“Nearly half a century ago, in an article spanning a mere nine pages,
Charles Tiebout revolutionized the way many think about American federalism.”).
3
See David Schleicher, The City as a Law Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV.
1507, 1508-09 (2010) (“The normative takeaway from the Tiebout model literature is
clear: metropolitan regions should be divided into many local governments that are
free to provide local public services in an unrestricted way.”); see also Richard
Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 1115, 1124 (1996) [hereinafter The Local Government] (observing that the
Tiebout model assumes that a “multiplicity of localities” will “enhanc[e] the
likelihood that one locality will approximate the mobile ‘consumer-voter’s’
preferences”).
4
See discussion infra Part I.A. As discussed below, Tiebout’s hypothesis was
about not only a quasi-market mechanism for the efficient provision of local public
goods, but also about the scale at which those public goods should be provided. See
infra text accompanying notes 39-41. In essence, one of Tiebout’s assumptions was
that there was an optimally efficient community size, and one aspect of Tiebout
sorting on the supply side would be local governments’ desire to attract residents to
reach that optimal size.
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In short, Tieboutian localism depends on local governments
competing for mobile residents in a defined metro area.5
The competition for mobile residents, however, is quite different
now than it might have appeared to Tiebout in the mid-1950s. Today,
when many people move, they are choosing — at least at certain
critical junctures in their lives — not among local governments in a
single metropolitan area, but among different regions altogether.6
College graduates, entrepreneurs starting new companies, employees
in technology or finance, and other people who have the resources to
relocate are no longer limited to one metro region. Instead, they are as
likely to weigh moving to greater New York versus the San Francisco
Bay Area, or even London or Beijing, as they are to be deciding
whether to live in Denver versus Boulder or Cass Corridor in
downtown Detroit versus Grosse Pointe.7
There is evidence — primarily from the literature on human capital
— that these interregional movers are making their locational choices
based, in some measure, on comparing bundles of regional-scale
public goods.8 Scholars have long identified regional job and housing
5
See Wallace E. Oates, The Many Faces of the Tiebout Model, in THE TIEBOUT
MODEL AT FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF WALLACE OATES 35 (2006)
[hereinafter TIEBOUT AT FIFTY] (noting that “[t]he conventional wisdom is that Tiebout
sorting is most likely in a metropolitan setting where an individual who works in the
center city (or elsewhere in the area) will have a wide choice among communities in
which to live”).
6
By some estimates, roughly 16 percent of the U.S. population has moved across
metropolitan area boundaries in the last five years, despite this being a period of
relatively low overall mobility as a result of the current economic downturn. See
discussion infra Part III.A.
7
This Article focuses on regionalism at the metropolitan scale, recognizing that
definitions of what might constitute a “region” vary significantly. Other scales of
governance — notably state and federal — can be relevant, but this Article is
concerned primarily with local governments and metropolitan regions.
8
Many movers who are choosing between metropolitan regions are relatively
better educated, higher skilled, and more attuned to the information economy.
Richard Florida famously called this segment of the populace the “Creative Class.” See
RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS 8 (2002) [hereinafter FLORIDA,
RISE]; see also RICHARD FLORIDA, CITIES AND THE CREATIVE CLASS 34 (2004) [hereinafter
FLORIDA, CITIES]; RICHARD FLORIDA, THE FLIGHT OF THE CREATIVE CLASS 5-8 (2007).
This description has drawn a fair share of criticism. See, e.g., Ann Markusen, Urban
Development and the Politics of a Creative Class: Evidence from the Study of Artists, 38
ENV’T & PLAN. A 1921, 1924 (2006) (challenging the purported causal link between
creative classes and high-tech industry clusters). See generally Jamie Peck, Struggling
with the Creative Class, 29 INT’L J. URB. & REG. RES. 740 (2005) (arguing that creative
class strategies have little real impact on “urban policy orthodoxies” and may even
entrench urban inequalities). But this description does capture the essence of people
involved in “design, education, arts, music and entertainment, whose economic
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markets, and natural amenities, as drivers of regional growth.
Increasingly, however, regional mobility is animated by the kinds of
amenities — a variety of public goods among them — that are
supplied at a regional level. When a recent college engineering
graduate is deciding where to locate, she is apt to think as much about
regional job and housing markets as she is about any given set of local
conditions.9 And the broad-scale infrastructure that supports an
attractive metro-level knowledge and innovation ecosystem, such as
universities, medical centers, and cultural institutions, can require the
critical mass only available at a regional scale.10
Not surprisingly, local governments competing for economic growth
in a knowledge-based economy — all the more so in the aftermath of
the global financial crisis — are increasingly responding to the
preferences of this segment of the mobile populace.11 Competition
function is to create new ideas, new technology and/or creative content.” FLORIDA,
RISE, supra at 8.
9
This is not to argue that knowledge workers are the only interregional movers.
Intermetropolitan mobility involves an array of movers, including retirees and
workers in traditional economic sectors. See discussion infra Part II.A. That said,
people associated with “high human capital” seem to play an outsized role in the
contemporary public dialogue about interregional mobility.
10
Separating those aspects of why and where people choose to move that relate to
governance from those aspects that focus on other aspects of locational choice is a
difficult task, given that public goods can influence other motivations. The literature
on mobility suggests a variety of explanations for the relative importance of various
factors, including the advantages of proximity to other people — what economists call
“agglomeration” — but the Tiebout model assumes that the preferences of marginal
movers for public goods is a meaningful aspect of locational choice (and meaningfully
influences governance). This Article accordingly begins with the same assumption. See
discussion infra Part II.B.
11
See, e.g., Jennifer Collins, Detroit Pushes Back with Young Muscles, N.Y. TIMES (July
3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/03/fashion/the-young-and-entrepreneurialmove-to-downtown-detroit-pushing-its-economic-recovery.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
(“Detroit’s revival is also being attributed to the city’s ‘15 by 15’ initiative, started in
2008. With a goal of getting 15,000 young talented households to downtown by 2015,
government workers, entrepreneurs, philanthropists, business leaders and individuals,
along with nonprofit groups, have been working to entice the 94 percent of college
graduates who initially migrate to cities, according to recent census figures.”); see also
COLUMBUS COLLEGE OF ART & DESIGN, CREATIVE COLUMBUS: A PICTURE OF THE CREATIVE
ECONOMY OF CENTRAL OHIO 6-3 (2009), available at http://www.ccad.edu/files/aboutccad/communications/ccfullreport.pdf (describing efforts to nurture the “creative
economy” of the Columbus region to attract “young professionals or creative talent”);
How Now Brown Town: A Former Steel City Is Now Proclaiming Its Cleaner Land and
Clever Minds, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 14, 2006), http://www.economist.com/
node/7914950 (describing Pittsburgh’s efforts to clean up industrial land for uses that
suit the modern economy in an effort to attract creative or knowledge-intensive workers
and firms).
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between metro areas now spurs calls for investment in a variety of
regional institutions and amenities.12 Indeed, there is a frequent refrain
in current discussions of local economic development that captures
the animating principle behind this dynamic precisely: “capital follows
talent.”13 And attracting talent is increasingly a regional undertaking.
This competition for interregional mobile residents, and particularly
for “high human capital” movers who value regional amenities, has
important consequences for the structure of metropolitan governance.
The same confluence of demand for particular bundles of public goods
and the ability of fragmented local governments to supply them that
has been at the heart of the Tieboutian argument for localism can be
inverted in the context of interregional mobility. Interregional
mobility that creates competitive demand for regional-scale public
goods justifies empowering the regional-scale supply of those public
goods. Simply put, just as traditional intraregional mobility supports
devolution, the need to compete in a marketplace of interregional
consumer-voters creates a mobility case for regional governance.14
This new normative justification for regionalism has clear legalstructural consequences. Just as legal scholars have invoked the
traditional Tiebout paradigm to undergird decentralization,
12
See, e.g., JONATHAN ROTHWELL ET AL., PATENTING PROSPERITY: INVENTION AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS METROPOLITAN AREA 36 (2013),
available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2013/02/patenting%
20prosperity%20rothwell/patenting%20prosperity%20rothwell.pdf
(discussing
how
mayors and governors have started investing in higher education and research to
encourage regional goals and industry).
13
See, e.g., Michael Bloomberg, Cities Must be Cool, Creative and In Control, FIN. TIMES
(Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c09235b6-72ac-11e1-ae73-00144feab49a.html
#axzz2dXxg6XZ9 (“I have long believed that talent attracts capital far more effectively and
consistently than capital attracts talent. The most creative individuals want to live in places
that protect personal freedoms, prize diversity and offer an abundance of cultural
opportunities. A city that wants to attract creators must offer a fertile breeding ground for
new ideas and innovations.”). This view up-ends the traditional focus of much local
economic development on capturing factories and other hard capital investments to then
attract or support human capital.
14
The majority of actual residential moves in any given year are still made by
people within given metropolitan regions. See discussion infra Part II.A. But Tiebout
was proposing a market mechanism for the efficient allocation of public goods, which
assumes that the preferences of the marginal consumer will predominate. Accordingly,
the types of high human capital interregional movers who have a broad array of
locational options are likely to be more salient in that quasi-marketplace. This crossmetropolitan mobility, domestically and internationally, gives these mobile residents
an outsized role in demanding governance that corresponds to their sensitivity to
regional public goods. This regional perspective thus adds a significant centrifugal
counterweight to the overwhelming centripetal force that intraregional mobility has
exerted in arguments for local governance.
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interregional mobility can correspondingly bolster doctrinal and
legislative support for regionalism. This does not mean that any
particular regional institution or mechanism will necessarily respond
best to regional-scale demand — consolidation, inter-local
cooperation, or a host of other governance structures might be
appropriate.15 But it does suggest that the law should facilitate the
ability of savvy “suppliers” to follow where that demand leads. Thus,
in core areas of local government law such as land use, education,
taxation, and other local functions, interregional competition justifies
state-level legislative efforts to promote regionalism. It also bolsters
judicial recognition of the necessity, in some contexts, of ceding local
authority to regional concerns. Likewise, municipal annexation and
dissolution might be facilitated legislatively and doctrinally, and there
might correspondingly be need for greater caution when it comes to
the relative ease of municipal secession and incorporation.
It bears noting at the outset that the Tiebout model has long been
criticized for the distributional consequences of local residential
sorting and the paradigm’s tendency to commodify governance.16 A
regionalist version of the model does not necessarily mitigate these
critiques, and in some respects may exacerbate them. Thus, it is
possible — and there is some evidence to support this — that the
spatial distributional problems that intraregional sorting generates are
simply being replicated at a larger scale.17 Likewise, the effort, energy,
and focus that local governments at a regional scale might put into
policies targeting mobile members of the information economy are
arguably just a variation of the kind of governance-as-marketplace that
has concerned so many scholars about Tiebout’s influence. That said,
regional mobility’s counterbalance to the devolutionary tendencies of
the traditional paradigm might mitigate distributional concerns within

15

See Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored
Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 2028 (2000)
(discussing “new regionalism” as “any attempt to develop regional governance
structures or interlocal cooperative arrangements that better distribute regional
benefits and burdens”); see also H. V. Savitch & Ronald K. Vogel, Paths to New
Regionalism, 32 ST. & LOC. GOV’T. REV. 158, 161 (2000) (contrasting governmental
approaches to regionalism through formal institutional mechanisms with
“governance” approaches that recognize that “existing institutions can be harnessed in
new ways”).
16
See discussion infra Part I.B. The Tiebout model has also been criticized for the
practical policy consequences of metropolitan fragmentation and devolution’s
tendency to exacerbate local externalities problems, among other concerns.
17
See infra text accompanying notes 209-11.
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regions and could promote public investments that, by recognizing
shared regional fate, pose less threat to community.18
In sum, mobility is almost always associated with structural
fragmentation and strong localism in the discourse of local
government law. Despite the limitations of the Tiebout model’s
admittedly simplifying assumptions,19 and sustained criticism of its
consequences, the paradigm retains a great deal of intuitive appeal
because it seems to capture an important element of local
governance.20 But the legal literature on localism that has relied on the
Tiebout model fails to acknowledge sufficiently that the scale of
locational choice implicates the scale of governance. If metropolitan
regions are increasingly competing against each other for residents
who choose their location in many respects based on regional-scale
public goods, then the appropriate scale of governance is regional.21
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains the traditional
Tiebout model and canvasses its reception in legal literature. It then
outlines recurring critiques of the influence of residential sorting as an
argument for localism. Part II turns to the empirics of interregional
mobility and alternative conceptions of the role that mobility might
play in the scale of local governance. The conceptions contrast the
18

See discussion infra Part III.B.
See discussion infra Part I.B.1.
20
The existence of Tiebout sorting at the local government level has a fair amount
of empirical support. See, e.g., Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions:
Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 521-23
(1991) (summarizing much of the evidence); Keith Dowding, Peter John & Stephen
Biggs, Tiebout: A Survey of the Empirical Literature, 31 URB. STUD. 767, 775-79 (1994)
(surveying over 200 articles on empirical tests of Tiebout sorting). But see William W.
Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition:
Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 239-43 (1997)
(arguing that while the studies, taken together, support the demand side of the
Tiebout model, they fail to directly support the supply side assertion that local
government actors actively compete for residents with tax/public goods packages). For
a general survey of the broader evidence of intergovernmental competition beyond the
context of residential mobility, see Albert Bretton, The Existence and Stability of
Interjurisdictional Competition, in COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 37, 38-48 (Daphne A.
Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991).
21
The fact that metropolitan regions increasingly compete at a regional scale has
been recognized in the legal literature. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Beyond City and
Suburb: Thinking Regionally, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 203, 205 (2006) [hereinafter
Beyond City and Suburb] (discussing regional governance as a strategy to improve
economic competitiveness in a global economy where metropolitan regions are the
“units of economic competition”). But the dynamics and implications of the link
between interregional residential mobility and the legal structure of local governance
have not been sufficiently explored.
19
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types of movers that local governments court in the modern economy
as well as the interests that drive those movers’ locational decisions.
Part III, in turn, argues that this interregional perspective on
residential mobility generates a conceptual and practical
counterweight to the devolutionary tendency of the traditional
Tieboutian paradigm. It then explores the implications of this
counterweight for the doctrine of regionalism. Finally, the Part revisits
critiques of sorting and suggests avenues for further research on
mobility in an era of global cities.
I.

RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY AND DEVOLUTION IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE

As noted, an important concept in the local government legal
literature derives from the Tiebout model of local governance as a
quasi-market for mobile residents. This Part explains the underlying
paradigm, explores how legal scholars have invoked it to justify
localism, and then outlines the primary critiques of this devolutionary
argument.22
A. Tiebout’s Legal-Structural Consequences
In his A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, Charles Tiebout set out to
solve the basic problem in public finance of how to get the public to
reveal its preferences for public goods.23 Paul Samuelson famously
22

In the legal literature, as in economics, tropes of interjurisdictional competition
are also invoked for a variety of non-devolutionary arguments, such as the discipline
of exit as a constraint on governmental rent seeking. See, e.g., Been, supra note 20, at
478 (noting that various bodies of law assume that interjurisdictional competition
would provide sufficient constraints to state and local government from
overreaching); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Federalism,
115 YALE L.J. 72 (2005) (contending that interjurisdictional competition produces
efficient law); see also Pettys, supra note 2, at 484-87 (canvassing the broad array of
topics on which arguments about interjurisdictional competition have been deployed).
This Article does not engage directly with this larger discourse on the intersection of
mobility and governance, instead focusing on mobility’s consequences for governance
scale.
23
See generally William A. Fischel, An Introduction to the Tiebout Anniversary
Essays, in TIEBOUT AT FIFTY, supra note 5. The Tieboutian paradigm is only one
example of a set of rational-choice explanations for local government behavior.
Another approach argues that local governments, rather than competing for the
marginal mobile resident, will set the level of public goods in a way that seeks to
maximize the utility of the median voter. A contemporary example of this view can be
found in William Fischel’s argument that because many households hold a large
proportion of their wealth in homeownership, and the asset value of the home reflects
the bundle of local public goods and taxes, local governments will tend to be
particularly sensitive to these “homevoters.” WILLIAM FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER
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argued that there was no decentralized pricing mechanism through
which collective preferences for public goods (which he called
“collective consumption goods”) could be revealed.24 The problem of
free riding, Samuelson argued, would tend to cause people to signal
less interest in public goods than they would under competitive
conditions.25
Tiebout responded, however, that a way exists to get individuals to
reveal their preferences for public goods, at least on certain
simplifying assumptions. If residents can choose among a variety of
local jurisdictions that each offer a distinctive bundle of taxation,
spending, and regulatory environments, then those consumer-voters
could metaphorically shop by relocating.26 People would thus reveal
their preferences for a given level of output of public goods by
choosing the jurisdiction that best fit their preferences.27 In this way,
the possibility of entrance (and, of course, exit) creates a kind of
market for public goods and, assuming a sufficient variety of
HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL
FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 96-98 (2005). A third approach in this vein
emphasizes the public-choice imperatives of local officials seeking to maximize their
preferences, particularly around expenditures. See, e.g., William A. Niskanen, The
Peculiar Economics of Bureaucracy, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 293 (1968) (setting forth a
model for government expenditures informed by demand conditions).
24
Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 387, 388 (1954). Tiebout was also responding to Richard Musgrave’s similar
argument that there was, as Tiebout put it, “no ‘market type’ solution” to determine
the optimal level of public goods. Tiebout, supra note 1, at 416.
25
Samuelson, supra note 24, at 388.
26
See Tiebout, supra note 1, at 418.
27
It is almost obligatory in articles about Tiebout to attempt a definition of the
notoriously tricky concept of “public goods,” most of which repeat the basic
proposition that such goods (in the sense economists use the term) are nonexcludable and non-rivalrous. See, e.g., Aaron J. Saiger, Local Government Without
Tiebout, 41 URB. LAW. 93, 94 n.1 (2009) (citing ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L.
RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 665-66 (6th ed. 2005)). This certainly makes sense as far
as it goes. As the Tiebout hypothesis has filtered into the legal literature, however,
strict definitions of public goods have become less important, given that the efficiency
of the sorting mechanism is thought to apply to almost any kind of preference for
public policies. See, e.g., Anup Malani, Valuing Laws as Local Amenities, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 1273 (2008) (positing that local laws can be an amenity that influences locational
decisions); Christopher Serkin, Local Property Law: Adjusting the Scales of Property
Protection, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 883, 898-903 (2007) (arguing for a Tieboutian
mechanism of sorting responsive to varying levels of local government protection for
property rights); see also Nicole Stelle Garnett, The People Paradox, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV.
43, 65 (2012) (describing “safety” as a public good in the context of Tiebout sorting).
It is this broader sense of the work of local governments — the mix of public services,
regulatory environment, and tax burden — that this Article deploys.
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locational choices and a lack of constraints on mobility, the public
resource allocation that results from this sorting process should tend
to be efficient.28
Tiebout was primarily concerned with mechanisms for setting the
optimal supply of public goods.29 As Roderick Hills has pointed out,
however, the Tiebout model is most often invoked in the legal
literature to assess horizontal and vertical divisions of authority
among various levels of government.30 In particular, scholars regularly
invoke the Tiebout model to support arguments for devolution and
decentralization.31 This argument is fairly straightforward, focusing on
28
See Oates, supra note 5, at 23 (Tiebout “tries to establish a kind of equivalence
between the local public sector and a competitive market so that he can invoke the
various properties of a competitive equilibrium to show that local finance induces
individuals to reveal their preferences for local public goods and does so in such a way
as to promote an efficient use of resources”). Tiebout was focused on allocative
efficiency (how close are the outputs of local governments approximating consumervoter preferences), but the distinct question of productive efficiency (how much
output comes from a given input) is often raised in discussions of mobility and
metropolitan fragmentation. See Keith Dowling & Thanos Mergoupis, Fragmentation,
Fiscal Mobility, and Efficiency, 65 J. POL. 1190, 1190 (2003).
29
Since the Tiebout hypothesis began to gain traction through the work of
Wallace Oates, scholars have debated whether Tiebout was concerned only with
preference revelation, or was also interested directly in decentralization. See Oates,
supra note 5, at 22 (citing Paul Seabright’s argument that Tiebout’s model was not
“saying anything about the decentralization of power in government”). Oates has
argued that decentralization is still efficiency-enhancing even in the absence of
sorting. See generally WALLACE E. OATES, THE DECENTRALIZATION THEOREM (1972).
30
See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Compared to What? Tiebout and the Comparative
Merits of Congress and the States in Constitutional Federalism, in TIEBOUT AT FIFTY, supra
note 5, at 239, 240.
31
The proliferation of structural prescriptions associated with Tieboutian localism
is akin to the outgrowth of a kind of normative Coaseanism that is arguably removed
from Ronald Coase’s actual work — what Robert Ellickson contrasted as the
cardboard Coase and the real Coase. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and
Against “Coaseanism,” 99 YALE L.J. 611, 612-13 (1989). We do not mean to create a
cardboard (localist) Tiebout here, but rather highlight the frequent invocation of
Tieboutian sorting as an argument in the legal literature for fragmentation and local
empowerment.
Interestingly, Tiebout himself may have been more open to regionalism than the
devolutionary reception his market-based theory of local governments would suggest.
In a 1961 article he co-authored with Vincent Ostrom and Robert Warren, Tiebout
argued that market discipline for determining the level of public goods was only
appropriate “for those public goods which are internalized within the boundaries of a
given political jurisdiction.” Vincent Ostrom et al., The Organization of Government in
Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 831, 838 (1961). For
many other public services, Tiebout, Ostrom, and Warren argued that a more
appropriate scale might be what they described as the polycentric political system at
the metropolitan level. Id. at 838-42 (arguing that metropolitan areas operate for many
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local governments of general jurisdiction as the suppliers of public
goods within the Tieboutian quasi-market.32 The legal-structural
prescription from the supply side is that metropolitan regions should
have relatively more of these jurisdictions with relatively greater local
autonomy to facilitate “consumer” choice.33 This means that it should
be relatively easier for communities to form local governments or
secede from larger governmental units. It also means that, all things
being equal, these fragmented localities should enjoy more legal
authority — through home rule, preemption, scope of delegation, and
other doctrines — to carve out their own niches in the metropolitan
marketplace.34
public services in a rich and intricate framework of intraregional cooperation and
negotiation, and using that as a frame against which to compare more localized public
goods).
32
The influence of mobility on local governments emerges in very different ways
depending on the kind of mobile “asset” that is at issue. Tiebout focused on residential
mobility, but other scholars have applied the idea of interjurisdictional competition to
capital investment decisions, regulatory environments, fungible capital, and other
fluid “resources.” See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition:
Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992) (discussing the impact of regulatory environments on
interjurisdictional competition). Moreover, paradigms of entrance and exit and their
influence on the output of public goods play out in very different ways depending on
the particular type of fluid resource at issue — residents, capital investments, new
industry, mobile capital — even if the idea of competition for mobile residents tends
to collapse into a more general proposition that any kind of mobile resource might be
subject to this kind of competition. See, e.g., Been, supra note 20, at 478 (arguing that
interlocal competition for development will serve as a check on local protectionism);
Serkin, supra note 27, at 886 (describing a real-estate-developer-oriented view of
Tieboutian competition and noting that developers “often choose among a package of
incentives offered, or fees demanded, by competing municipalities, depending on the
desirability of the development and the costs and benefits it is expected to create”).
This Article’s discussion of interregional mobility follows Tiebout’s lead by focusing
on the particular confluence of governance and residential mobility.
33
See Schleicher, supra note 3, at 1508-09 (summarizing this proposition).
34
The idea that mobility supports devolution has been applied in the broader
discourse of federalism as one way of supporting arguments for relatively greater
recognition of state-level interests over federal authority. See, e.g., Hills, supra note 30.
Despite its prominence, a devolutionary prescription is by no means the only logical
conclusion to be reached from the Tiebout paradigm. Todd Pettys has offered the
intriguing counterargument in the national context — which is theoretically
applicable at any intermediate scale — that one ironic consequence of mobility may be
that it creates incentives for consumer-voters to seek federal policy on issues of their
preference. To Pettys, mobile citizens might want uniform, or favorable, regulatory
conditions no matter where they may eventually move, may want to influence people
in other jurisdictions, and may seek to control interstate externalities. All of this might
actually spur mobile residents to prefer policymaking be situated at the highest level
available to satisfy their preferences. See Pettys, supra note 2, at 497-518. This
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Two points bear noting at this juncture about the devolutionary
tendencies of residential sorting. First, Tiebout did not disaggregate
different types of mobile residents, given that his model situates at its
core the fact of heterogeneous preferences across the mobile
population. Tiebout, for example, made the stylized assumption that
residents were unconstrained by employment because they all lived on
dividend income.35 The paradigmatic mobile resident in the Tiebout
model is thus not individuated in any way; it is the nature of the
bundle of local public goods and tax burden, rather than any
individual circumstances, that drives locational choice.36 In other
words, because Tiebout’s consumer-voters are presumed to be moving
primarily for the comparative advantages of a given governmental
context, these mobile consumer-voters are presumed to span the range
of potential preferences. For Tiebout, then, there is nothing distinctive
about any given mobile resident, and all mobile residents equally
participate in the same preference-sorting mechanism.37 In practice,
however, some mobile residents tend to have greater influence in the
interaction between mobility and governance, as we explain below.38
Second, underlying the Tiebout hypothesis is a set of assumptions
about the scale of public goods — both in terms of demand and
supply. Tiebout himself used the example of a public beach — arguing
that a community of a certain size might have a certain demand for a
given size of beachfront.39 This is about as local a public good as can
be imagined, as Tiebout describes it as a fixed feature of the local
landscape within the boundaries of a single jurisdiction.40 Put another
way, these public goods — and the broader mix of governmental
services, taxation, and regulation that might attract consumer-voters
— are assumed to be “local” for intuitive reasons that vaguely invoke
some notion of the appropriate scale of governmental entity to provide
that particular good.41
argument has intuitive appeal, but does not obviate the structural prescriptions
normally associated with mobility.
35
See Tiebout, supra note 1, at 419.
36
Tiebout made this assumption to isolate the effect of governmental policy on
mobility and, of course, the effect of mobility on governmental policy.
37
This ignores the distinction between willingness to pay and ability to pay,
among other simplifying assumptions discussed below. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
38
See discussion infra Part II.B.
39
Tiebout, supra note 1, at 419.
40
The fact that a public beach is classically congestible does not mean that the
Tiebout model applies only to such public goods. As noted, the paradigm has been
applied to a broad array of governmental outputs. See sources cited supra note 27.
41
Cf. Hannah Wiseman, Public Communities, Private Rules, 98 GEO. L.J. 697, 727
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But the scale of both demand and supply in the Tiebout model need
not be local at all. This aspect of sorting is most often simply assumed.
Many public goods that the literature tends to assume are “local” have
no inherent fixed scale. Public safety, education, land use regulation
— indeed, the entire range of classic local government functions —
have been and are today supplied to some extent by regional-scale
public entities.42 There are reasons, independent of responding to the
preferences of mobile residents, in terms of accountability,
effectiveness, and efficiency, to supply any given public good at the
most local level at which it can be provided. But there are
countervailing arguments in terms of inclusion, economies of scale,
the scope of impact for regional supply, and network effects.43 The
argument in this Article will hold these countervailing propositions
constant, given that the appropriate level of government to supply any
given public good is an empirical question, in order to focus instead
on the influence of mobility on governance.
In sum, for Tiebout, mobility was decidedly a metropolitan-scale
phenomenon, and the basic intersection of supply and demand of
public goods in the model focused on local-level concerns. Legal
scholars have drawn on this framework to argue for devolution and
decentralization in governmental authority and structure, but the link
between scale and the metaphorical transaction of Tieboutian mobility
can be shifted if the scale of residential choice is not simply local.
Before we turn to that shift, it is important to pause and consider some
critiques of the basic paradigm and its potential consequences.

(2010) (noting that consumer-voter preference sorting can be sub-local as well as
local).
42
School districts, for example, often transcend the boundaries of the local
governments of general jurisdiction they serve, and some school districts even
encompass regional scale. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Making a Regional District:
Memphis City Schools Dissolve into its Suburbs, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 47, 48-49
(2012).
43
See Roger B. Parks & Ronald J. Oakerson, Regionalism, Localism, and
Metropolitan Governance: Suggestions from the Research Program on Local Public
Economies, 32 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 169, 170-71 (2000); see also Laurie Reynolds,
Intergovernmental Cooperation, Metropolitan Equity, and the New Regionalism, 78 WASH.
L. REV. 93, 109-11 (2003) (discussing regionalist arguments). Economists have
developed a literature on the scale of public goods, focusing on a variety of supplyside questions, such as economies of scale and scope for particular public goods and,
in the institutional economics literature, on the structure of local service providers.
The literature on localism and regionalism has also disaggregated, on the supply side,
between the production of public goods and the provision of those goods, noting that
arguments for regional supply need not imply any particular institutional arrangement
for that supply. See Parks & Oakerson, supra, at 170-71.
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B. Critiques of Sorting’s Devolutionary Implications
There are two general lines of criticism that have emerged to the
paradigm of mobility influencing local governance. The first set of
critiques, which we label internal, challenges the assumptions and the
functioning of the model itself. The second, which we label
consequential, raises instrumental and conceptual concerns about the
results of privileging transactional entrance (and exit) in local
decision-making, notably around distributional concerns and the
perils of commodification. We address these concerns here to assess
their relevance to a perspective on mobility that shifts from localist to
regionalist.44
1.

Internal Critiques

There are several basic grounds on which the Tiebout model has
been challenged in terms of the mechanism it describes.45 First, some
commentators have argued against the plausibility of consumer-voters
making locational choices based on the packet of available public
services, regulation, and taxation.46 People move for a variety of
reasons, so the argument goes, whether for employment opportunities,
housing preferences, or familial obligations.47 These choices have little
to do — at least directly — with local governance and the “noise”
from these determinants of locational choice will almost always drown
out the “signal” of the effect of governance. The best that can be said
on this point is that there is empirical evidence of Tiebout sorting,48
that people may have ways (perhaps indirect) to cut through the
informational clutter,49 and many aspects of locational choice that
44

See discussion infra Part III.B.
Wallace Oates pointedly noted that the Tiebout model relies on “a set of
assumptions so patently unrealistic as to verge on the outrageous.” Wallace E. Oates,
On Local Finance and the Tiebout Model, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 93, 93 (1981). That has,
however, hardly diminished the model’s influence.
46
Cf. Robert C. Ellickson, Legal Sources of Residential Lock-Ins: Why French
Households Move Half as Often As U.S. Households, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 373, 378-93
(surveying motivations for relocation and legal constraints on mobility).
47
See, e.g., id. at 394-98; Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV.
317, 387-88 (1997) (“People can and do move, but inertia is a large factor in why each
of us lives where we do. Even when moves occur, they tend to be for reasons largely
unrelated to government policy decisions: We move because our work takes us
elsewhere, or because of marriage or some other personal need, or perhaps because of
climate and health.”).
48
See sources cited supra note 20.
49
See generally Kenneth N. Bickers & Robert M. Stein, The Microfoundations of the
Tiebout Model, 34 URB. AFF. REV. 76 (1998) (discussing informational heuristics and
45
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might seem endogenous actually do reflect the effects of local
policies.50
Second, commentators have argued that there is no clear mechanism
for channeling the threat of exit and the promise of entrance into the
political process, at least at the level of salience that the Tiebout
paradigm assumes. Tiebout was largely silent about the actual process
through which the local political system would operate to produce a
mix of local public goods that would appeal to a given set of mobile
residents.51 Many scholars have accordingly critiqued the absence of
politics in the Tiebout model,52 as well as the lack of consideration for
how consumer-voters might actually evaluate (and influence) the
political process through entrance and exit, rather than through
“voice” and “loyalty,” to continue with the Hirschman frame.53
Some scholars have offered ways to reconcile the Tieboutian quasimarket with more realistic assumptions about the local political
process and the governance-related information that might be
available to Tiebout’s footloose residents.54 For present purposes,
however, it is only necessary to acknowledge Tiebout’s assumption
that there would be some mechanism — which was not necessary to
define — for the local political process to create a bundle of public
goods that allowed competition for mobile residents.55 This
proxies as a tool to foster Tieboutian sorting by consumer-voters).
50
See Pettys, supra note 2, at 505.
51
Tiebout merely said, taking an oddly agnostic view of the line between public and
private entities, that “communities below the optimum size, through chambers of
commerce or other agencies seek to attract new residents.” Tiebout, supra note 1, at 419.
52
See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Tiebout Models and the Competitive Ideal: An
Essay on the Political Economy of Local Government, in 1 PERSPECTIVES ON LOCAL PUBLIC
FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 23 (John M. Quigley ed., 1983) (discussing models of
local government behavior and arguing in favor of incorporating realism in
assumptions about that behavior).
53
See, e.g., Bratton & McCahery, supra note 20, at 234. Albert O. Hirschman
famously contrasted methods through which stakeholders could respond to negative
conditions in various institutions: “exit” (leaving the institution) and “voice”
(participation). Hirschman argued that “loyalty” would influence the relative valence
of exit and voice. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY:
RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
54
See Saiger, supra note 27, at 98-102 (discussing the literature).
55
Urban theory and some strains of local government legal theory have long
focused on the limits of local authority in the face of mobile capital and labor. See
Richard C. Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and the Democratic
City, 123 HARV. L. REV. 482, 489-91 (2009). The Tieboutian framework, by contrast,
assumes as a baseline at least some ability to compete and a corresponding view of
local governments as empowered entities. See Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 2, at
399-419, 426. Of course, there are significant differences in kinds of mobile factors

2013]

The Mobility Case for Regionalism

79

simplifying assumption can still pertain even if institutions at different
scales of governance are the locus of intergovernmental competition,
although there may be greater practical barriers to regional
governance.56
These internal critiques — and other challenges to Tiebout’s basic
hypothesis57 — may have validity, but we are generally assuming for
the sake of argument that the overall paradigm works roughly in the
way Tiebout proposed. Those who assert that governance is not
influenced by mobility should, as a default matter, be inclined to be
skeptical of that mechanism at whatever scale it plays out.58
2.

Consequentialist Critiques

For all of its undoubted influence in the legal literature, the
devolutionary tendencies of the Tiebout model have raised significant
consequential concerns.59 These primarily focus on the tendency of
sorting to exacerbate socio-economic, racial, and ethnic segregation
and, more conceptually, on the threat that a theoretical “marketplace”
of local governance poses to local democracy and community.60
that might influence local politics. See sources cited supra note 32.
56
See infra text accompanying notes 176-180.
57
See generally John D. Donahue, Tiebout? Or Not Tiebout? The Market Metaphor
and America’s Devolution Debate, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 73 (1997) (arguing that devolution
will do more to hinder government than improve it). These critiques focus, for
example, on the potential distorting effects in practice of the simplifying assumptions
that Tiebout made to model mobility as a driver for the output of public goods. See,
e.g., Oates, supra note 45 (discussing the simplifying assumptions inherent to
Tiebout’s model). To note again, this Article does not focus primarily on these
technical responses to Tiebout’s original stylized model, but rather on the reception of
the model in the discourse in legal literature on vertical division of governmental
authority.
58
See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
59
Aaron Saiger has perceptively argued that it is important to disaggregate
critiques of localism from more particular concerns about the consequences of the
Tieboutian mechanism of sorting. See Saiger, supra note 27, at 95. We accept this
proposition for purposes of this discussion and focus particularly on critiques of
arguments derived from the devolutionary implications of Tiebout’s quasi-market, not
on the nature of local government itself or the problems that might arise from
fragmentation, such as an increase in negative externalities. See Briffault, Our
Localism, supra note 2, at 433-34.
60
Some legal scholars have also critiqued the devolutionary tendencies of the
Tiebout model for the challenges that its resulting fragmentation pose for solving
complex, regional-scale problems. William Buzbee, for example, has argued that
municipal fragmentation can create a regulatory tragedy of the commons, where
collective action problems create incentives for regulatory inattention that prevent
appropriate intervention. See William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory
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The first, and perhaps most powerful, consequentialist critique of
Tieboutian sorting highlights the distributional consequences that
flow from fragmentation and the competition for mobile residents.
The heart of this critique focuses on the reality that ability to pay is
not the same as willingness to pay — in other words, many consumervoters, given their financial constraints, are simply not able to choose
the mix of public amenities that they would genuinely prefer.61 This
limitation may be acceptable for many market transactions, indeed it is
inherent to the nature of most markets, but is objectionable when
applied to education, public safety, local environmental quality, and
other aspects of the Tieboutian bundle of public goods. It also ignores
the reality that jurisdictions do not compete passively in this model
(and in real life) by simply proffering a bundle of local public goods
and seeing who responds. Rather, local governments use their
authority to constrain entrance in ways that skew the “market” in
favor of more desirable residents.62
Indeed, one of the most important assumptions in the Tiebout
model is that mobility is unconstrained. This assumption is not only
false as a general matter,63 but becomes particularly troubling when
mobility is constrained because of discrimination and the legacy of
segregation. Thus, some scholars argue that the distributional
consequences of Tiebout sorting have a pernicious racial and ethnic
component in addition to a basic tendency toward economic
segregation.64
Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 49-52 (2003). This is a
valid concern but applies to devolution more generally and is not particular to the
quasi-marketing sorting mechanism itself that Tiebout posited.
61
See Saiger, supra note 27, at 94 (noting that because the Tieboutian argument
for “efficiency assumes a budget constraint — goods are efficiently allocated if they go
to those most willing to pay for them — efficiency in the distribution of public goods
helps the rich more than the poor”).
62
As a number of scholars have noted, if locational preferences reflected in
Tiebout sorting correlate with wealth, then Tiebout’s method of achieving allocative
efficiency can encourage the wealthy to seek communities — and communities to
respond to this preference — that privilege exclusion. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell,
Exclusion’s Attraction: Land Use Controls in Tieboutian Perspective, in TIEBOUT AT FIFTY,
supra note 5, at 163; Saiger, supra note 27, at 122, 134, 140 (asserting that if local
governments are given more flexibility, they would likely draw discriminatory
boundaries).
63
See Gerald Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 33 (1998) (noting that
when exclusionary zoning is incorporated into the Tiebout model, communities have
both the incentive and the means to calve off in order to compete for the wealthiest
residents and exclude the poorest, in order to enlarge their tax base and avoid the
costs of providing for the neediest citizens).
64
See, e.g., Cashin, supra note 15, at 2016-19 (discussing the role race plays in
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A second source of concern about Tieboutian sorting in the legal
literature comes from commentators who criticize what it means
conceptually, and in practice, to conceptualize local governments as
firms competing for customers. These scholars contend that this kind
of commodification of local governance undermines community and
warps the public nature of what local governments are actually about.
Gerald Frug argues, for example, that focusing on competition treats
the kinds of services that cities provide as “objects of consumption,”
rather than elements of common interest.65 It also tends to reinforce
the idea that people choose a place “in the way they choose a country
club,” that is, to be with other like-minded people.66 Similarly, Richard
Schragger asserts that the Tieboutian quasi-marketplace generates a
privatized conception of local government in which ability to pay
drives local decision-making, and the consumptive ideal creates a
distorted sense of entitlement in exclusion.67
These closely related concerns about the distributional and
commodifying consequences of Tieboutian mobility can be
counterbalanced by defenses of the value of localism.68 For our
purposes, however, it is not necessary here to take a position on what
has been a more than fifty-year-long debate. Rather, these concerns are
worth rehearsing for the light they shed on alternative conceptions of
the role of mobility that highlight locational choice-based levels of
governance beyond the purely local. It is to those conceptions that we
now turn.69
II.

INTERREGIONAL MOBILITY AND CONTEMPORARY HUMAN CAPITAL

Despite important critiques, the Tiebout model retains its
explanatory power in support of strong norms of localism. The
paradigm, as noted, assumes that residential sorting and jurisdictional
locational sorting in American metropolitan regions); see also Richard Thompson
Ford, Geography and Sovereignty: Jurisdictional Formation and Racial Segregation, 49
STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1366 (1997); Alexandra M. Greene, An Examination of Tiebout
Sorting and Residential Segregation Through A Racialized Lens, 8 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J.
135, 136 (2008).
65
Frug, supra note 63, at 28-29.
66
Id.
67
See Richard Schragger, Consuming Government, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1824, 1848
(2003).
68
See, e.g., Saiger, supra note 27 (discussing the many advantages of Tieboutian
localism and efficiency).
69
We will return to these critiques below to examine the extent to which a
regionalist perspective on Tieboutian mobility alters their parameters. See discussion
infra Part III.B.
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competition takes place among local governments within a region, and
does so with some empirical support. This conception is incomplete,
however, as sorting and competition for mobile residents occurs
among metropolitan regions, qua regions, not just the localities within
them.
To understand this proposition, this Part evaluates the empirical
evidence that a significant portion of the population moves
interregionally. It then canvasses the proposition that these mobile
residents are attuned to regional-scale amenities and that metropolitan
regions are, as an economic and social unit, as salient as local
governments. The Part concludes by considering the relevance of
recent debates about what motivates mobility — particularly the
balance between agglomeration economies and amenities in the
competition for human capital — for the light these debates shed on
the regional scale of the preferences of many mobile residents.
A. The Salience of Metropolitan Regions for Mobility
Much residential mobility in the United States is intraregional, with
the majority of moves occurring within the same county and/or within
the same state.70 It is therefore easy to assume that the prototypical
Tieboutian consumer-voter “shops” only between communities within
a given metropolitan region.71 This assumption, however, ignores the
fact that a significant portion of residential moves every year are from
region to region. These movers are, in essence, engaged in a process of
regional comparison shopping. At least some — and an increasingly
important subset of — mobile residents are thus expressing their
preference for regional goods and services, not simply comparing local
governments. Not surprisingly, then, regions are competing for mobile
residents. This is evidenced by economic development policies aimed
at attracting and retaining these residents.
70
See, e.g., JASON P. SCHACTER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY: 1990–
1995 1 (2000) [hereinafter SCHACTER, 1990–95], available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2000pubs/p23-200.pdf (listing the five-year moving rates, in the period between
1975 and 1995, which demonstrate that the majority of moves, over 50 percent, are
within the same county; approximately 20 percent occur between counties within the
same state; approximately 20 percent occur between counties in different states; and
about 5 percent of moves are from abroad); JASON P. SCHACTER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY: 2002–2003 2 (2004), available at http://www.census.
gov/prod/2004pubs/p20-549.pdf (finding that, similarly, in the period between 1993 and
2003, approximately 59 percent of moves were within the same county; approximately
19 percent were between counties within the same state; approximately 19 percent were
between counties in different states; and about 3 percent of moves are from abroad).
71
See Oates, supra note 5, at 34-35.
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The Empirics of Interregional Mobility

Significant portions of the population make interregional moves
each year, moving from one metropolitan area to another.72 Census
data reflects this regional movement by tracking net in-migration and
out-migration for the largest metropolitan areas in the country.73
There are other sources of mobility data that fill out the picture on
how and where the population moves in a given year, including IRS
data and the Current Population Survey data, but all are flawed to
some extent.74 One study, for example, estimated that over an average
five-year period about 15 percent of the United States population
moves across metropolitan area boundaries, although the study noted
that it was only able to capture a subset of moves from another
identified metropolitan area or across state or county lines.75
72
This interregional and interstate mobility is significant given that, according to
the most recent U.S. Census data, as of 2010 over four-fifths of the population
(roughly 83 percent) lived in the nation’s 366 major metro areas. See PAUL MACKUN &
STEVEN WILSON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND CHANGE: 2000 TO
2010, 4 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br01.pdf.
As discussed below, interregional metropolitan competition is no longer simply a
domestic phenomenon, instead playing out increasingly as an international
competition between so-called “global” cities and the regions that support them. This
also has consequences for conceptions of the relationship between mobility and
governance, as we shall see. See discussion infra Part III.C.
73
See, e.g., SCHACTER, 1990–95, supra note 70, at 2 (reporting five-year net
domestic migration for the top 20 metropolitan areas). This same Census series also
tracks mobility among the broader regional sections of the Northeast, Midwest, South
and West. See id. at 4-6 (reporting five-year net migration for these major regions).
74
See Raven Molloy et al., Internal Migration in the United States, 25 J. ECON.
PERSP. 173, 178-79 (2011) (explaining the different sources of migration data and
drawbacks of each). As Malloy et al. acknowledge, it is very difficult to capture with
much precision the fraction of the population that crosses metropolitan area
boundaries because of limitations in the scope of the data and how it is collected. Id. at
175-76 (explaining that metro areas do not cover the entire U.S., especially rural
areas; that metro area boundaries are revised every few years; and that metro area
identifiers are not available in many public datasets). Given these limitations,
researchers often use state and county lines to provide a reasonable proxy of
intermetropolitan migration because those lines best approximate local labor and
housing markets. See id. at 179.
75
See id. (using Census and American Community Survey data and averaging
across the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Censuses). “According to five-year migration
statistics from the Census and one-year migration statistics from ACS, virtually all (97
percent) of cross-state migrants also changed metropolitan areas, while only 60 to 70
percent of migrants across metropolitan areas also changed states.” Id. This suggests,
according to these researchers, that interstate migration underestimates the number of
people that move across local labor and housing market boundaries, and intercounty
migration overstates metro area migration, as only three-quarters of cross-county
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Given these challenges, we examined county-to-county migration
data from the Internal Revenue Service as well as the Census Bureau’s
five-year American Community Survey.76 Examining the ten largest
metropolitan areas in 2009 and 2010,77 the data indicate that about
16.5 percent and 16.2 percent, respectively, of all residential moves
represented immigration from outside the metro region.78 These
results are broadly consonant with other research and reinforce the
proposition that, although there has been a general downward trend in
migration over the past 25 years or so,79 of those who do migrate, a
significant fraction choose to move to new metropolitan regions.
2.

The Role of Metropolitan Regions in Mobility Decisions

Population growth patterns across the United States suggest that
large metropolitan regions are a destination for the most mobile of
residents. The vast majority of Americans live in major metropolitan
migrants changed metro areas. Id. at 180.
76
The Internal Revenue Service data was the County-to-County Migration Inflow
Dataset from the IRS’s Statistics of Income Division (“SOI”), extracted from the IRS
Individual Master File, which contains administrative data collected for every Form
1040, 1040A, and 1040EZ processed by the IRS. Each return is geocoded with a five
digit number that tracks state and county, and migration status can be determined by
matching subsequent returns over a two-year period. See generally INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE, SUPPLEMENTAL DOCUMENTATION FOR MIGRATION DATA PRODUCTS, 2009-2010,
http://www.irs.gov/file_source/pub/irs-soi/0910inpublicmigdoc.doc (providing details
on how IRS migration data was collected) (last visited Sept. 22, 2013).
77
The analysis was limited to these two years based on data availability, as the SOI
data is not yet available for 2011 and the ACS survey only began providing
information on a county level (in the five-year data series) in 2009. See AMERICAN
COMMUNITY SURVEY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 2-4 (2009),
available at http://www.census.gov/acs/www/Downloads/survey_methodology/acs_
design_methodology.pdf. The analysis used the U.S. Office of Management and
Budget’s (OMB) metropolitan statistical area (MSA) delineations as the basis for
determining relevant metro regions. See 2010 Standards for Delineating Metropolitan
and Micropolitan Statistical Areas, 75 Fed. Reg. 37,246 (June 28, 2010).
78
The population of the top 10 MSAs in 2009 and 2010 was 58,725,300 and
58,971,589, respectively, per the SOI data. A total of 9,706,525 and 9,527,372 people
migrated, using a combination of SOI and CPS data. Of these migrants, 6,690,500 and
6,579,031 moved within their county of origin, according to CPS data. The SOI
indicates that 1,443,157 and 1,466,089 migrants stayed within the MSA, but moved to
a county other than their county of origin. Finally, 1,572,868 and 1,482,252 people
moved into the MSA from outside of the MSA (SOI), which provides an estimate for
interregional migration.
79
See Molloy et al., supra note 74, at 173, 180-81 (noting the puzzling decline in
migration from 1980–2009; that interstate and interregional moves reached their
“inflection point” in 1980; and that migration rates, including across short distances,
are currently lower than at any point in post-War period).
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areas consisting of a core urban population of 50,000 or more, and
such areas grew almost twice as fast as smaller urban areas in the last
10 years.80 Moreover, the fate of smaller urban areas seems to be
inextricably tied to the fate of the largest nearby major metropolitan
areas.81 In fact, large metropolitan regions are responsible for a
significant portion of the population growth in their respective states82
and many of the fastest growing counties in the United States are part
of these large, integrated metro regions.83 Therefore, both as a
geographic unit and as a destination, metropolitan regions are a
destination for many Americans, and current urban growth patterns
increasingly bear this out.84
Metropolitan regions are important for understanding a key aspect
of contemporary domestic mobility for at least two reasons. First,
regions are increasingly integrated social and economic units and not
simply a set of distinct counties and local municipalities.85
80
See MACKUN & WILSON, supra note 72, at 4-6 (noting that over four-fifths, or
83.7 percent, of the U.S. population in 2010 lived in the nation’s 366 major
metropolitan areas consisting of a core urban population of at least 50,000 and that
one-tenth, or 10 percent, of the population lived in the nation’s 576 “micro” areas
consisting of a core urban population between 10,000 and 50,000). According to the
latest Census, the most populous metropolitan regions include New York-Northern
New Jersey-Long Island; Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana; Chicago-JolietNaperville;
Dallas-Fort
Worth-Arlington;
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington;
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown; Washington-Arlington-Alexandria; Miami-Fort
Lauderdale-Pompano Bach; Atlanta-Sandy-Springs-Marietta; and Boston-CambridgeQuincy. The fastest growing metro regions include quite populous (1 million or more)
metro regions such as Las-Vegas-Paradise; Raleigh-Cary; and Austin-Round Rock-San
Marcos. Id. at 4.
81
Id. at 5 (noting that “[m]any of the fastest growing ‘micro’ areas were located
near fast-growing metro areas” and, “[l]ikewise, many of the micro areas that were
slow-growing” or in decline were located near slow-growing or declining major
metropolitan areas).
82
As an example, the Atlanta metro region accounted for over two-thirds (68
percent) of Georgia’s population growth during the last decade; the Houston and
Dallas-Fort Worth metro regions together accounted for over one-half (56.9 percent)
of Texas’ population growth over the same period; and the Las Vegas metro area
accounted for almost four-fifths (81.9 percent) of Nevada’s growth. Id. at 4-5.
83
See id. at 8-9 (giving as examples counties in the metro Chicago, Palm Coast,
Washington, D.C., Dallas-Fort Worth, among others, which more than doubled their
population between 2000 and 2010).
84
There is an identity element to this as well. People within metropolitan areas
may jealously guard the distinction between neighborhoods, but ask any American
traveler abroad where they’re from and chances are that they will at least start by
answering with the metro area where they live.
85
See ZACHARY NEAL, THE CONNECTED CITY: HOW NETWORKS ARE SHAPING THE
MODERN METROPOLIS 111 (2012) (noting that “metropolitan character comes from the
fact that the independent parts of these regions — cities, suburbs, towns — are really
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Metropolitan regions traverse many counties, and sometimes more
than one state, and are generally composed of a core urban area and
adjacent counties that have a “high degree of social and economic
integration (as measured by commuting to work) with the urban
core.”86
Traditional commuter patterns of suburb-to-suburb and suburb-tocity illustrate this integration as metro areas move from core-andperiphery models to increasingly interconnected networked regions.87
So too does the increased rate of “reverse commuting,” in which
people increasingly live in the central city and work in one of the
surrounding suburbs.88 The increase in reverse commuting over the
past twenty years or so reflects not only the decentralization of
employment within metropolitan areas, but also mobility trends into
large urban markets and, more particularly, into core cities to take
advantage of the consumption value of those cities.89 All of these
patterns underscore increasing metropolitan functional integration.
Second, and to underscore the first point, it seems apparent that
regions attract residents, not simply individual municipalities or even
counties.90 Metropolitan regions — that is, core cities and their
not independent at all, but are closely linked to one another in a wide variety of
ways”); see also BERNADETTE HANLON, JOHN RENNIE SHORT & THOMAS J. VICINO, CITIES
AND SUBURBS: NEW METROPOLITAN REALITIES IN THE U.S. 3-6 (2010).
86
See MACKUN & WILSON, supra note 72, at 4.
87
OMB’s broad definition of metropolitan areas — “Core Based Statistical Areas”
— underscores the view of metro regions as central cores and peripheral areas, which
also resonates with historical views of metropolitan regions, such as Von Thunen’s
“city and hinterland” view and the Chicago-school concentric-circle model. See NEAL,
supra note 85, at 111-12. Increasingly, however, scholars are recognizing the
networked nature of metro regions in ways that emphasize functional interconnection
across a region over the center/periphery paradigm. See id. at 112-13.
88
See Edward Glaeser et al., The Consumer City, 1 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 27, 33-34
(2001) [hereinafter Consumer City] (noting that city-to-suburb commutes almost
tripled between 1960 and 1990). As an example, Glaeser measured the relative rise in
population of employed workers in the Bay Area relative to the rise of employment in
the area. Central San Francisco was one of only three counties where population rose
faster than employment between 1960 and 1990. This rise reflects the increase in San
Francisco residents who work outside of the city and presumably live in the city for
consumption reasons. Id. at 34.
89
See Edward L. Glaeser & Joshua D. Gottlieb, Urban Resurgence and the
Consumer City, 43 URB. STUD. 1275, 1284-85 (2006) [hereinafter Urban Resurgence].
90
Nicole Garnett has argued that the link that regionalists make between cities
and suburbs ignores the reality that for many suburban residents, “central cities likely
play only a small role in [their] economic lives,” and that because some residents have
had “decidedly anti-urban experiences,” they “may lack the aesthetic and cultural
affinities that would lead them to take advantage of urban amenities” in their center
cities. Nicole Stelle Garnett, Suburbs as Exit, Suburbs as Entrance, 106 MICH. L. REV.
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surrounding suburbs — are attractive to consumers because of the
presence of goods and services which have regional-scale economies
dependent on large audiences (e.g., sports teams, large opera
companies, comprehensive arts museums, and the like).91 Even more
salient in the modern economy, regional urban scale supports
institutions such as medical centers, large universities, networks of
entrepreneurs, and other aspects of an ecosystem of innovation that
depend on a certain critical mass.92 And, of course, housing and labor
markets in most metropolitan areas tend to operate on a regional
scale.93 Location decisions are accordingly likely to account for the
social and economic amenities and assets of the metropolitan region,
not simply its constituent parts. As Richard Briffault has argued, given
the high correlation between city and suburban growth in
employment, income, and population, localities within a region “tend
to rise and fall together.”94
It is true that the social and economic health of the central city often
drives the perception of the region as a whole, in part because “central
cities continue to be the setting of many specialized activities, business
services, and cultural amenities that serve the surrounding
metropolitan region.”95 However, even when commercial activity is
concentrated in suburban nodes or edge cities, the attractiveness of
those parts of the region are driven by what its constituent parts offer
to incoming industry and workers.96 To the extent that one or more
localities in those commercial nodes are unable to provide the type
and level of public goods and amenities that appeal to the desired
277, 295 (2007). That does not belie the reality that regional movers — even if they
move, as many surely do, from a suburb in one region to a suburb in another — are
still making regional-scale decisions.
91
See Glaeser et al., Consumer City, supra note 88, at 32-34 (noting that scale
economies meant that specialized retail can only by supported in places large enough
to have a critical mass of customers).
92
See generally ALAN BERUBE, METRONATION: HOW U.S. METROPOLITAN AREAS FUEL
AMERICAN PROSPERITY (2007) (discussing metropolitan-scale drivers of economic
growth).
93
Ironically, intraregional mobility in the traditional Tieboutian paradigm actually
underscores the reality that both labor markets and housing markets are increasingly
regional in scale. People within a region have options as to where to move and where
to work — often constrained, it is true — but make those decisions in the context of a
metropolitan area.
94
Briffault, The Local Government, supra note 3, at 1138-39.
95
Id. at 1139.
96
See David L. McKee & Yosra A. McKee, Edge Cities and the Viability of
Metropolitan Economies: Contributions to Flexibility and External Linkages by New
Urban Service Environments, 60 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 171, 177-78 (2001).
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industry and mobile residents, the attractiveness of the region
suffers.97 It is thus the amenities and features of the region itself that
often make it a distinct “place” — features that can transcend any
particular local government within a metropolitan area, even if they
can in some respects be a product of the aggregation of the region’s
local amenities.98 In short, for interregional moves, much of what
lends salience to the choice of one metropolitan area over another is
inherently regional in scale.99
B. Regional-Scale Demand: The Role of Agglomeration Economies and
Urban Amenities
It is not simply that metropolitan regions fundamentally matter as
economic and social units for purposes of understanding current
patterns of residential mobility. It is also that certain types of movers
are particularly salient to understanding contemporary interregional
mobility. This section explores two contemporary understandings of
metropolitan mobility and growth in a knowledge-based economy,
each of which links what attracts human capital to the scale of
governance. These debates provide telling evidence that many
interregional movers do, in fact, make locational choices based in part
on a comparative evaluation of regional-scale institutions.

97
Briffault, The Local Government, supra note 3, at 1140 (noting that “the
consequences of inadequate local schools, unsafe local streets and homes,
unaffordable local housing, and unreliable local transportation networks in some
localities may be borne by all localities throughout the region, including those
localities providing high-quality services to their own residents”).
98
Local governments’ ability to fully control the quality or availability of amenities
for its residents is limited as a result of interlocal and regional spillovers. As Richard
Schragger has astutely noted, the full costs and benefits of local amenities are borne
not just by residents within the local jurisdiction, but also by neighboring users who
“regularly cross borders” across localities. Schragger, supra note 67, at 1830-31. Thus
the quality and availability of even “local” amenities are determined as much by local
residents as by residents throughout the region. These interlocal or regional effects, in
turn, affect home values within a region, reducing the ability of local governments to
fully control those values within their own borders. Id. at 1830 (pointing to evidence
that “much of the value of one’s housing investment — negative or positive — might
very well turn on the specific decisions, activities, or fiscal health of neighboring
jurisdictions”).
99
It is fair to ask at this juncture whether interregional movers may simply be
localists seeking their preferred Tieboutian local government bundle of public goods
in metropolitan regions other than their own. We bracket this question for the
moment and return to it in depth below. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
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The Importance of Human Capital in Understanding Mobility

As noted, the traditional Tiebout framework assumes the
heterogeneity of mobile residents and the agnosticism of local
governments to the range of consumer-voters.100 It is increasingly
clear, however, that some potentially mobile residents are more salient
than others in driving contemporary metropolitan growth. The
geographic sorting of people by education and by skill is well
recognized, with the higher skilled and the better educated becoming
increasingly mobile, but also more concentrated in certain
metropolitan regions.101 Education and skill level, in particular, are
strongly correlated with the most populous and fastest-growing
metropolitan regions.102 Not only are the most educated and most
skilled most likely to pick up and move, but they tend to move longer
distances than people with fewer skills and a lower level of
education.103
The traditional twentieth-century understanding of urban regional
growth posited that the dominant factors in county and city
population expansion were due to the natural advantages of certain
locations. Since World War II, strong predictors of urban growth have
included a region’s temperature and climate, dryness, and proximity to
the coast and natural resources.104 However, over roughly the past
100

See supra Part I.A.
See ENRICO MORETTI, THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF JOBS 164 (2012); Richard Florida,
Where the Brains Are, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 1, 2006), http://www.theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/2006/10/where-the-brains-are/305202/; see, e.g., Chistopher R. Berry
& Edward L. Glaeser, The Divergence of Human Capital Levels Across Cities, 84 PAPERS
IN REG. SCI. 407 (2005) (documenting that places with higher levels of human capital
have attracted more skilled people over the last decade).
102
See, e.g., RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS, REVISITED 203-18
(2012) [hereinafter FLORIDA, RISE REVISITED] (the “creative class” is concentrated
geographically in specific regions); Edward L. Glaeser & Albert Saiz, Rise of the Skilled
City, 5 BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URB. AFF. 47 (2003) (aside from climate, skill
composition may be the most powerful predictor of urban growth).
103
See JASON SCHACTER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WHY PEOPLE MOVE: EXPLORING THE
MARCH 2000 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 1 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2001pubs/p23-204.pdf (noting that research shows that increases in age reduce the
likelihood of moving until retirement age and that long distance moves are most
common among the highly educated); see also SCHACTER, 1990–95, supra note 70, at 3
(25-29 year olds have highest moving rates; reporting that 74.5 percent of them moved
during 1990–1995; further reporting that 63 percent of 20-24 and 30-34 year olds
moved during this period).
104
See, e.g., Glaeser et al., Consumer City, supra note 88, at 35-36 (explaining that
“results of multivariate regression show that county population growth shows the
power of these natural variables to predict growth”); Glaeser & Gottlieb, Urban
Resurgence, supra note 89, at 1280 (noting that the urban agglomerations that once
101

90

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 47:63

twenty years, there has been a notable shift away from this
understanding and towards the recognition that what drives urban
growth today, after the decline of major American cities in the 1970s
and 1980s, is the attraction of highly skilled, highly educated mobile
residents to major cities and their surrounding regions. This is not to
say that the natural amenities of some metropolitan regions do not
continue to attract residents.105 Rather, it is that other factors have as
much, if not more, explanatory and predictive power in understanding
why particular regions attract residents.106
Human capital theories that focus on the migration of workers with
high levels of talent to amenities-rich locations are now the dominant
explanation in urban economics for why some regions grow and
others remain stagnant or decline.107 These theories trace to seminal
works by Robert Lucas, Edward Glaeser, and Jane Jacobs, all of whom
argue that human capital externalities are the basic mechanism of
economic growth in cities.108 Since the 1980s, economists had
explored the idea that positive externalities from industry clusters are
the cause of increased productivity of firms and individuals. Positive
externalities occur when the “net benefits to being in a location
together with other firms increase with the number of firms in the

lined the great lakes and northern rivers of the U.S. had the great advantages in that
they were close to basic resources like coal and lumber and could access cheap waterborne transport).
105
Sunbelt cities and metropolitan areas such as Phoenix, Atlanta, Dallas, and
Houston, for example, have seen dramatic population growth in recent decades.
Glaeser & Gottlieb, Urban Resurgence, supra note 89, at 1284-85 (noting that “the
general trend to ‘sun and sprawl’ has continued relatively unabated over the past 20
years”).
106
For example, the elasticity of housing supply explains some of the rise of
Sunbelt cities in the 1990s. The housing supply, in turn, reflects the combination of
abundant land, freeways, and pro-growth permitting. Edward L. Glaeser & Joshua D.
Gottlieb, The Wealth of Cities: Agglomeration Economies and Spatial Equilibrium in the
United States, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 983, 998 (2009) [hereinafter Wealth of Cities]
(arguing that the urban growth literature has paid little attention to differences in
housing supply that are critical to understanding the growth of metropolitan areas
with high growth levels, moderate prices and moderate incomes like Houston and
Atlanta).
107
See FLORIDA, CITIES, supra note 8, at 35-36, 45; Todd M. Gabe, The Value of
Creativity, in HANDBOOK OF CREATIVE CITIES 128-45 (David Emanuel Andersson et al.
eds., 2011); Glaeser & Gottlieb, Urban Resurgence, supra note 89, at 1276-80.
108
See JANE JACOBS, THE ECONOMY OF CITIES 233-34 (1969); Edward L. Glaeser et
al., Growth in Cities, 100 J. POL. ECON. 1126, 1151 (1992) [hereinafter Growth in
Cities]; Robert E. Lucas, On the Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J. MONETARY
ECON. 3, 36, 40 (1988).
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location.”109 As first suggested by Alfred Marshall in Principles of
Economics,110 industrial agglomerations exist in part because firms
benefit from the higher productivity that results when skilled workers
are located in the same region, thereby reducing labor search costs.111
Clustered firms also benefit from economies of specialization, allowing
the production of non-tradable specialized inputs, reduced costs of
transporting materials from suppliers to customers, and informational
spillovers that can stimulate growth and innovation in an industry.
Industry clusters are found in Detroit’s automotive sector, New York
City’s theater and garment industries, and technology firms in Silicon
Valley, among others.112
Based on this literature, urban economists like Glaeser have found
similarly that individuals move to cities not only to increase their
wages, but also to capitalize on the concentration of others from
whom they can learn and increase their human capital.113 In this view,
certain individuals move to cities and surrounding suburbs to increase
their human capital gains by living close to people from whom they
109
See W. Brian Arthur, ‘Silicon Valley’ Locational Clusters: When Do Increasing
Returns Imply Monopoly?, 19 MATHEMATICAL SOC. SCI. 235, 237 (1990).
110
Adam Smith had much earlier famously observed that economic specialization
is fostered by the kind of density that prevails in urban environments. See ADAM
SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 121-22 (Andrew Skinner ed., Penguin Books 1999)
(1776) (noting that the division of labor, limited by the extent of the market, means
that certain trades can be carried on “nowhere but in a great town,” and people are
required to be generalists in “so desert a country as the Highlands of Scotland”).
111
ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 332-33 (1890) (noting that “so
great are the advantages which people following the same skilled trade get from near
neighbourhood to one another”); Paul Krugman, Increasing Returns and Economic
Geography, 99 J. POL. ECON. 483, 484-85 (1991).
112
FLORIDA, RISE REVISITED, supra note 102, at 220 (also citing the maquiladora
electronic and auto-parts districts in Mexico, the clusters of disk-drive manufacturers
in Singapore, the flat-panel display industry in Japan, clusters of insurance companies
in Hartford, casinos in Las Vegas, furniture manufactures in High Point N.C., and
advanced imaging laboratories in Rochester, NY); see also PAUL KRUGMAN, GEOGRAPHY
AND TRADE 35 (1991) (finding that most manufacturing sectors and many producerservice industries have a large presence in a few geographical locations and very little
going on elsewhere); Glenn Ellison & Edward L. Glaeser, Geographic Concentration in
U.S. Manufacturing Industries: A Dartboard Approach, 105 J. POL. ECON. 889, 891-92
(1997) (discussing Silicon Valley-style localizations of individual manufacturing
industries in the United States).
113
See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser, Are Cities Dying?, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 139, 148
(1998) (suggesting that the externality of knowledge spillovers in agglomeration
economies may be more important at the individual level than at the firm level);
Edward L. Glaeser, Learning in Cities, 46 J. URB. ECON. 254 (1999) (arguing that
urbanization rises when returns to skills rise, the ability to learn by imitation rises,
and the level of health in the economy rises).

92

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 47:63

can learn and with whom they can interact. Migration itself can be a
form of human capital investment — a project that individuals can
undertake to raise the returns on their labor.114 In addition to
capturing returns on their labor, individuals also move to capture the
benefits of agglomeration in cities and metropolitan regions.
Agglomeration economics suggests that individuals more efficiently
acquire skills in urban metropolitan areas because of the greater
opportunities to interact with other highly educated and skilled
people, thus increasing the rates of human capital accumulation,
technological innovation, and ultimately, urban growth.115
Economists have found tangible payoffs, in the form of higher wages
and wage growth, for migrants to areas with a higher density of highly
educated and skilled people. Not only do they earn more than their
nonurban counterparts, but evidence suggests this urban wage
premium stays with them when they leave urban areas.116 The core
claim of agglomeration scholars is thus that individuals seeking
efficiency and productivity gains make location decisions on the basis
of where other individuals cluster. These agglomeration gains can
include the ability to learn from other workers and gain additional
skills through information spillovers, thereby increasing human
capital and productivity.117 Undergirding these dynamics is the move
114
Molloy et al., supra note 74, at 181. For example, a standard human capital
explanation for the propensity of the young to migrate is that migration is an
investment and “if a higher income stream is available elsewhere, then the sooner a
move is made, the sooner the gain is realized.” John Kennan & James R. Walker, Effect
of Expected Income on Individual Migration Decisions, 79 ECONOMETRICA 211, 239
(2011). Conversely, when returns to working in particular occupations become less
geographically dispersed, as one study shows they have, this can help explain the
falling migration rates in the past decade. See Greg Kaplan & Sam Schulhofer-Wohl,
Understanding the Long-Run Decline in Interstate Migration 50 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 18507, 2012), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
w18507.
115
Edward L. Glaeser & Matthew G. Resseger, The Complementarity Between Cities
and Skills, 50 J. REGIONAL SCI. 221, 242 (2010), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w15103 (finding that some human capital accumulation is faster in
metropolitan areas, that workers learn more quickly in metropolitan areas, and
speculating that as a result the rate of technology change in cities is faster); see also
Glaeser et al., Growth in Cities, supra note 108, at 1127-34 (reviewing recent theories
of economic growth which stress the role of technological and knowledge spillovers in
generating urban growth).
116
Edward Glaeser & David Mare, Cities and Skills, 19 J. LAB. ECON. 316, 340
(2001).
117
Giovanni Peri, Young Workers, Learning and Agglomeration, 52 J. URB. ECON.
582, 594, 603 (2002); James E. Rauch, Productivity Gains from Geographic
Concentration of Human Capital: Evidence from the Cities, 34 J. URB. ECON. 380, 399
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from a manufacturing to a knowledge-based economy over the past
half-century, which has raised the return on investments in human
capital and influenced the growth of technology and innovation
industries in urban areas.118
Another important possible gain from agglomeration of high human
capital is “matching,” a form of labor market pooling where workers
have a greater likelihood of obtaining a better match between their
skills and an employer and thereby increasing productivity and
wages.119 While the proximity strain of agglomeration economics
highlights the immediate benefits of smart people being near each
other, matching supports the advantages of a broad diversity of
opportunities. One advantage of being in an urban environment, then,
is being able to trade across specialties — whether in employment or
in the goods and services one offers.120 The greater the variety of
(1993). Although it is not clear exactly how the relationship works between workers’
higher level of productivity and their presence in high skilled cities — that is, whether
it is through “learning, innovation, both or neither.” Glaeser & Resseger, supra note
115, at 222.
Some scholars have even argued that highly educated and skilled individuals move
to cities and metropolitan areas to increase the likelihood of finding a spouse or, if
already married, to increase the likelihood that both spouses will find employment
commensurate with the skills of each spouse. See Dora L. Costa & Matthew E. Kahn,
Power Couples: Changes in the Locational Choice of the College Educated, 1940–1990,
115 Q. J. OF ECON. 1287, 1307 (2000); Lena Edlund, Sex and the City, 107
SCANDINAVIAN J. OF ECON. 25, 40 (2005).
118
See FLORIDA, RISE REVISITED, supra note 102, at 193-94; EDWARD GLAESER,
TRIUMPH OF THE CITY 28 (2011); Glaeser & Saiz, supra note 102, at 38, 42. Places with
high numbers of well educated and highly skilled people tend to grow faster, generate
higher incomes for their residents, and are generally better able to attract similar kinds
of people to them. Glaeser & Saiz, supra note 102, at 42; John M. Quigley, Urban
Diversity and Economic Growth, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 127, 134-35 (1998); Edward L.
Glaeser et al., Cities, Skills, and Regional Change 12 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 16934, 2011), available at http://www.nber.org/ papers/w16934.
119
Fredrik Andersson et al., Cities, Matching, and the Productivity Gains of
Agglomeration, 61 J. URB. ECON. 112, 127 (2007); see also James R. Baumgardner, The
Division of Labor, Local Markets, and Worker Organization, 96 J. POL. ECON. 509, 518
(1988); Sunwoong Kim, Labor Specialization and the Extent of the Market, 97 J. POL.
ECON. 692, 704 (1989).
120
Urban economists distinguish between the effects of urbanization (or
diversification) economies, associated with a city’s population and employment levels
and the diversity of its productive structure, and localization (or specialization)
economies, associated with a city’s specialization in one specific sector. See Edward L.
Glaeser et al., Growth in Cities, supra note 108, at 1129-30. Jane Jacobs, for example,
believed that the most important knowledge transfers come from outside the core
industry and, as a result, variety and diversity of geographically proximate industries
rather than geographical specialization promote innovation and growth. See JACOBS,
supra note 108, at 50-51.
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possible matches, the more specialization is fostered. These advantages
require a certain critical mass, and metropolitan regions as a whole
have a much easier time providing the requisite diversity than do
small local governments.
2.

The “Creative Class” and Contemporary Mobility Patterns

Richard Florida famously expanded on the human capital approach
by arguing that attraction of the “creative class,” a category that
includes the well educated and others with particular skills and
interests suited to the modern knowledge-based economy, is essential
to regional economic development.121 Florida focused on people
working in intensely creative occupations such as science, the arts,
architecture, writing, and in knowledge-intensive fields like financial
services and high technology.122
Providing the kind of urban amenities that will attract highly mobile
creative types, Florida argues, is fundamental to the growth of cities
and regions.123 To attract them, cities should offer amenities like the
arts and a cultural climate that appeals to young, upwardly and
geographically mobile professionals.124 Two key amenities that will
121
See generally FLORIDA, RISE REVISITED, supra note 102 (arguing that the creative
class is a vital part of regional economic development). According to Florida, the
creative class goes beyond highly educated people (degree holders) to highly skilled
people. While there is overlap between conventional measures of human capital (i.e.,
college degrees) and the creative class, they are not the same. Four in ten members of
the creative class — or 16.6 million workers (out of estimated 41 million creative class
workers; roughly one-third of U.S. workforce) — do not have college degrees. Id. at
40-41, 45.
122
Id. at 42.
123
Id. at 280-82. Florida is not alone in contending that metropolitan consumption
amenities are strongly correlated with the growth of cities and metropolitan areas. See,
e.g., Terry Nichols Clark et al., Amenities Drive Urban Growth, 24 J. URB. AFF. 493
(2002) (arguing that amenities play a larger role in driving growth in cities than is
reflected in the growth machine model); Glaeser et al., Consumer City, supra note 88
(finding that high amenity cities grow faster than low amenity cities); Jordan
Rappaport, Consumption Amenities and City Population Density, 38 REGIONAL SCI. &
URB. ECON. 553 (2008) [hereinafter Consumption] (finding that amenities support high
population density and that moderate differences in consumption amenities can create
vast differences in population density).
124
According to Florida, creative people do not move for traditional reasons. The
physical attractions that most cities focus on building — sports stadiums, freeways,
urban malls, and tourism and entertainment districts that resemble theme parks — are
irrelevant, insufficient, or unattractive to them. What they look for instead are
abundant high-quality amenities and experiences, openness to diversity of all kinds,
and above all else the opportunity to validate their identities as creative people. The
communities that the creative class are attracted to thrive because they are places where
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draw this class to a particular place are “tolerance” and diversity, the
measure of which is the concentration of bohemians (artists), gays,
and foreign-born populations, as well as the degree of racial
integration.125 Many of the most populous and fastest growing regions,
according to Florida, are distinguished by a new model of economic
development that takes shape around what he calls the “3Ts” of
development — technology, talent, and tolerance — with the most
successful metropolitan areas excelling at all three.126
For Florida, creative-class mobility is regional in its dynamics and
its implications. The attraction of the creative class to a city or county
has significant positive spillovers to the entire region, as the
concentration and interaction of creative people spurs high levels of
innovation and the expansion of technology-intensive sectors in the
region.127 Regions that attract the creative class also tend to provide an
environment that is more open to innovation, entrepreneurship, and
new firm formation.128 The presence of the creative class in a city or
region, in turn, will attract the kind of firms that rely upon these
workers.129 The growth of the creative class in a region leads directly
creative people want to live. Creative centers provide the integrated ecosystems or
habitat where all forms of creativity — artistic and cultural, technological and
economic — can take root and flourish. FLORIDA, RISE REVISITED, supra note 102, at 186.
125
This combination is tracked in what Florida calls the “Tolerance Index.” He has
found (as have others) that there is a positive relationship between tolerance and
economic growth. Id. at 244-49.
126
Id. at 228-36. Florida estimates that, as of 2010, the creative class composed
more than 40 percent of the workforce in 11 metropolitan regions, 35 to 40 percent of
the workforce in another 34 metropolitan regions, 30 to 35 percent of the workforce
in 105 metropolitan areas, and 25 to 30 percent in 162 metropolitan areas. Id. at 20607. On the flip side, there is only one metro where the creative class makes up less
than 20 percent of the workforce and 48 where it accounts for between 20 and 25
percent of workforce. Id. The 11 regions where the creative class makes up more than
40 percent of the workforce include San Jose, Silicon Valley, greater Washington D.C.,
and Boston; as well as smaller college towns such as Durham, Ithaca, Boulder, and
Ann Arbor. Id. at 11, 206. The creative class is even more concentrated by county than
by larger metro regions. Id. at 210-11; see also id. at 213-14 (distribution of creative
class by skill/industry type), 218-19 (working class enclaves), and 222-23 (service
class centers).
127
Id. at 232-33.
128
See id. at 245. See also Haifeng Qian et al., Regional Systems of Entrepreneurship:
The Nexus of Human Capital, Knowledge, and New Firm Formation, 13 J. ECON.
GEOGRAPHY 559, 560, 583 (2012) (reviewing studies finding positive relationship
between human capital and start-up firms, and finding in their study that tolerance is
a significant determinant of both human capital and new firm formation as it exerts
the strongest total effect on entrepreneurship).
129
See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser, The New Economics of Urban and Regional Growth,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY 83-98 (2000) (firms will follow
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to the growth of the “service class,” since the service economy is, in
large measure, a response to the demands of the creative economy.130
This multiplier effect from the growth of the creative class arguably
makes these regions more economically resilient over the long term.131
Florida has his share of critics,132 some of whom question the causal
relationship between the presence of the creative class and economic
growth.133 Nevertheless, many cities and counties have embraced
economic development policies that provide cultural amenities and
high levels of local service to attract and retain these mobile residents.
Such approaches range from branding cities “creative” places134 to
adopting tax increment financing and other development strategies
that will attract creative firms to cities.135 Even more common are
human capital to some degree, locating in areas of high human capital concentration
to gain competitive advantages); Ric Kolenda & Cathy Yang Liu, Are Central Cities
More Creative?: The Intrametropolitan Geography of Creative Industries, 34 J. URB. AFF.
487, 506-08 (2012) (finding central cities host a greater share of creative industries
and that creative jobs are more likely to be in central cities than other industries).
130
See FLORIDA, RISE REVISITED, supra note 102, at 47-48. Service workers are
typically low-wage, low-autonomy occupations such as food-service workers,
janitors/cleaners and groundskeepers, personal care attendants, secretaries and clerical
workers, and security guards. Florida notes that the economic gap between these two
classes underpins widening economic inequalities in America. There is also the
traditional “working class,” which is in decline — by his estimates, down from 33 to
26 million — and includes workers in production, transportation, repair and
maintenance, and construction. Id. at 46-48.
131
See FLORIDA, RISE REVISITED, supra note 102, at 50-51 (discussing studies
showing the presence of a large creative class in a region lowering the unemployment
rate); MORETTI, supra note 101, at 58-63 (noting that for every innovation job added,
another five jobs are added to local service economy, three times the multiplier effect
of manufacturing jobs).
132
These critics include Glaeser, who contends that Florida’s work is derivative of
other human capital theories of economic development, including his own. Edward L.
Glaeser, Review of Richard Florida’s The Rise of the Creative Class, CREATIVE CLASS
GROUP 2 (2004), http://www.creativeclass.com/rfcgdb/articles/GlaeserReview.pdf; see
also Richard Florida, Response to Edward Glaeser’s Review of the Rise of the Creative
Class, CREATIVE CLASS GROUP 2 (2004), http://creativeclass.com/rfcgdb/articles/
ResponsetoGlaeser.pdf.
133
See, e.g., Stephen Rausch & Cynthia Negrey, Does the Creative Engine Run? A
Consideration of the Effect of Creative Class on Economic Strength and Growth, 28 J. URB.
AFF. 473 (2006) (arguing that high human capital, high technology, culture, and
immigration predict current and future growth).
134
For example, Austin, Texas proclaims itself a “creative city” where locally
driven creativity and innovation thrive, notably the convergence of “music, film and
gaming into a digital media sector” as well as “clean energy advances,” are the drivers
of economic prosperity in the region. See Will Wynn, Creative Cities,
http://www.willwynn.com/creative-cities/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2013).
135
See, e.g., David N. Cicilline, Creative Providence: A Cultural Plan for the Creative
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cities that have targeted the development and cultivation of cultural
amenities as part of their urban revitalization plans.136 There is
evidence to suggest that these kinds of campaigns are working.
Mobility patterns indicate that the educated, skilled, and talented class
is disproportionately drawn to a small number of “cool” cities and
have concentrated in those surrounding regions.137
Edward Glaeser’s work on resurgent, large, dense metropolitan areas
similarly underscores the role of regional amenities in attracting the
kinds of high human capital and knowledge workers on which Florida
has focused.138 Consider the transformation of the most “resurgent”
Sector, CITY OF PROVIDENCE 12 (June 2009), http://www.providenceri.gov/
ArtCultureTourism/reports-publications (contemplating ways for the city to provide
financial assistance to new start ups).
136
See, e.g., Mark J. Stern & Susan C. Seifert, Cultivating “Natural” Cultural
Districts, THE REINVESTMENT FUND, PHILADELPHIA 1 (2007), http://www.trfund.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/06/NaturalCulturalDistricts.pdf (arguing that clusters of
cultural assets can lead to the revitalization of neighborhoods); see also Arthur Brooks
& Roland Kushner, Cultural Districts and Urban Development, 3 INT’L J. ARTS MGMT. 4,
4, 8 (2001) (surveying cities that have adopted special tax measures for cultural
funding with the goal of urban renewal); Michael Rushton, Earmarked Taxes for the
Arts: U.S. Experience and Policy Implications, 6 INT’L J. ARTS MGMT. 38, 38-48 (2004)
(survey of earmarking of revenues for arts and culture in the local and state
governments); Elizabeth Strom, Converting Pork into Porcelain: Cultural Institutions
and Downtown Development, 38 URB. AFF. REV. 3, 3, 5 (2002) (noting that so many new
facilities have been built in a relatively short time span and as part of an economic
revitalization program). But not all places have had success. In November 2002, voters
in metro Detroit’s Wayne and Oakland counties defeated a proposed property tax
increase earmarked for arts and culture. Michael Rushton, Support for Earmarked
Public Spending on Culture: Evidence from a Referendum in Metropolitan Detroit, 25 PUB.
BUDGETING & FIN. 72, 72 (2005).
137
See, e.g., CEOS FOR CITIES, THE YOUNG AND RESTLESS IN A KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 1
(2011), http://www.ceosforcities.org/research/the-young-and-restless-in-a-knowledgeeconomy/ (noting that over the last decade urban centers have increasingly become
the residential destination of choice for young college graduates); William Frey, Young
Adults Choose “Cool Cities” During Recession, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 1-2 (Oct. 28,
2011), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2011/10/28-young-adults-frey
(noting that, to the extent they are moving, young adults are headed to metro areas
which are known to have a certain vibe — college towns, high-tech centers, and socalled “cool cities”).
138
These places have been undergoing a renaissance over the past few decades as
places of consumption, not production. Glaeser & Gottlieb, Urban Resurgence, supra
note 89, at 1276. As the authors explain, evidence suggests that when cost of living is
adjusted for, real wages have been falling in dense urban areas and are now lower in
big cities than in small ones. Thus, urban resurgence is not primarily the result of
rising urban productivity, and falling relative wages are better viewed as evidence of
people’s increased desire to live in urban areas in part because of the increasing value
they place on social amenities (reflected by rising prices in large metro areas,
particularly dense ones, and the willingness to pay those prices). See id. at 1275-76,
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urban metropolitan regions — those that surround cities such as New
York, San Francisco, Boston, and Chicago. These regions and their
core cities have a number of attributes in common. They have
attracted successful industries that have done well in the information
economy, have high levels of educated and skilled residents, and
provide a rich set of consumption activities (theater, museum,
restaurants), among other attributes.139 While the populations of these
cities and regions have not grown considerably, in net terms, they
have nevertheless been transformed by the mobility of high-income
and high-skilled individuals into the region and the exodus of low
human capital manufacturing from the region.140
In contrast, many older, dense, urban regions surrounding cities,
such as Detroit and St. Louis, have industries that have done poorly,
have lower levels of highly educated and skilled workers, and few
consumption advantages.141 These regions are being kept alive largely
by long-lived housing stocks that are slowly depreciating. Cities like
this, with less skilled workers, have suffered a dramatic urban
decline.142 Some have bounced back, to be sure, and have done so
through a strategy aimed at providing the type of amenities that attract
the creative class. Pittsburgh’s remarkable renaissance over the past
two decades is a telling example. After the steel industry collapse in
the 1980s, Pittsburg halted what might have been an inevitable and
unstoppable decline by pursuing an economic development strategy
aimed at attracting high-tech industry, investing in large, regionalscale arts institutions and sports venues, and transforming its old
1281-83; see also Rappaport, Consumption, supra note 123, at 551 (finding that
moderate differences in consumption amenities can cause large differences in
population density and such amenities are more strongly capitalized into housing
prices than wages); Jordan Rappaport, The Increasing Importance of Quality of Life, 9 J.
ECON. GEOGRAPHY 779, 801 (2009) (finding strong relationship between local quality
of life and relative urban population density).
139
Glaeser et al., Consumer City, supra note 88, at 46; see also William Frey,
Demographic Reversal: Cities Thrive, Suburbs Sputter, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 1-2 (June
19, 2012) [hereinafter Demographic Reversal], http://www.brookings.edu/research/
opinions/2012/06/29-cities-suburbs-frey (noting that “core primary cities” such as
Atlanta, Denver, and Washington, D.C. have been growing faster than their
surrounding suburbs; what these core cities have in common are important urban
amenities and economic bases that are attractive to young people and other
households now clustering in their cities).
140
Glaeser et al., Consumer City, supra note 88, at 46. The same phenomenon also
characterizes many European cities such as London, Paris and Barcelona. Id.
141
Id. at 47 (also noting the European counterparts to Detroit and St. Louis, such
as Manchester, that similarly have lower levels of human capital and few consumption
advantages).
142
Glaeser & Saiz, supra note 102, at 42.
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industrial area into an entertainment and shopping destination.143
Moreover, many companies in the region today were formed from the
intellectual capital concentrated in the Pittsburgh region’s twenty-five
colleges and universities.144 The Pittsburgh region was rated one of the
five best places for the “creative class,” among other accolades it has
received in recent years.145
This suggests that a particularly important subset of interregional
movers is attuned to certain regional-scale amenities, including the
regional human capital market (such as how many people have
advanced degrees, the number and quality of universities in the
region, and the like) and regional housing and job markets. These
movers are also assessing and responding to regional-scale public
goods, given that such public goods — the regional context of public
services, regulatory environment, and tax burden — are indirectly
reflected in regional amenities and regional markets. The argument
that interregional residential movers in general, and high human
capital individuals in particular, value regional-scale amenities may be
somewhat inferential, but there is much logic to the proposition.

143
See Pittsburgh’s Renaissance, POPULAR PITTSBURGH 1-3, http://www.popularpittsburgh.
com/pittsburgh-info/pittsburgh-history/renaissance.aspx (last visited Sept. 10, 2013)
(recounting history of Pittsburg’s renaissance); see also Martin Prosperity Insights: Is Your
Region . . . Creative, Innovative, Productive, . . . or Just Populated? MARTIN PROSPERITY
INSTITUTE 1, 2 (2012), http://martinprosperity.org/media/MSA%20 Patents%20Insight_
v01.pdf.
144
Frank Giarratani et al., Dynamics of Growth and Restructuring in the Pittsburgh
Metropolitan Region, UNIV. OF PITTSBURGH 12 (1999), http://www.briem.com/papers/
duisburg.PDF.
145
Pittsburgh’s Renaissance, supra note 143, at 1. Just as highly skilled, creative
class types are migrating to metropolitan areas which offer them density,
agglomeration knowledge economies, and consumption amenities, many other
regional movers are sorting themselves into different metropolitan markets. These
interregional movers are also attracted to regional-scale factors, but of a different
nature than those that seem to appeal to creative class types. The factors at work in
the densest urban regions, for example, do not seem to explain the rise of the
“Sunbelt” metropolitan regions — which include cities such as Houston, Dallas,
Atlanta, and Phoenix — characterized by high growth levels, moderate prices, and
moderate incomes. Glaeser and Gottlieb’s explanation for the trend over the last few
decades toward “sun and sprawl” is elastic housing supply due to abundant land,
freeways, and pro-growth land use policy, rather than rising consumer amenity values
or productivity. Glaeser & Gottlieb, Urban Resurgence, supra note 89, at 1284-85;
Glaeser & Gottlieb, Wealth of Cities, supra note 106, at 998-99. Thus, the presence of
these regional amenities (both natural and governmental) permitted those attracted to
the region to satisfy their preferences for cheap suburban housing and a warm climate.
Edward L. Glaeser & Kristina Tobio, The Rise of the Sunbelt, 74 S. ECON. J. 609, 641
(2008).
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Agglomeration, Amenities, and Interregional Mobility

The distinction between the explanation for interregional mobility
offered by agglomeration economics and the “amenities” approach
represented most prominently by Florida has generated an ongoing
debate.146 Both share a focus on mobility and what attracts high
human capital individuals, but they differ on what draws this class to a
particular locality or region, and thus what role policymakers can play
in attracting them. The amenities approach is arguably consistent with
a Tieboutian approach if local governments or metro regions see
themselves as competing for this class of mobile residents by offering
the kind of public goods that would attract educated, skilled, and
creative residents. Agglomeration economies, however, more directly
spring up as a market through individual location choices (albeit in a
context influenced by local policies). Although it is possible to view
agglomeration economies themselves as a local public good,147 such
economies are not as clearly a direct product of government policy.148
In fact, as David Schleicher has argued, there may be a tension
between Tieboutian sorting and agglomeration effects in that local

146
See, e.g., Yong Chen & Stuart S. Rosenthal, Local Amenities and Life-Cycle
Migration: Do People Move for Jobs or Fun?, 64 J. URB. ECON. 519 (2008) (1970–2000
Census data indicates that cities with improving business environments acquire
increasing shares of workers, especially with high human capital; cities with
improving consumer amenities become relatively more populated by retirees; and that
regardless of marital status, young, highly educated households tend to move towards
places with higher quality business environments); Richard Florida et al., Inside the
Black Box of Regional Development: Human Capital, the Creative Class and Tolerance, 8
J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 615 (2008) (finding that “cultural economy” has both a direct
and indirect relationship to regional development); Allen Scott, Jobs or Amenities?
Destination Choices of Migrant Engineers in the USA, 89 PAPERS IN REGIONAL SCI. 43
(2009) (finding that local employment opportunities and not amenities guide the
migratory shifts of migrant engineers); Jesse M. Shapiro, Smart Cities: Quality of Life,
Productivity, and the Growth Effects of Human Capital, 88 REV. ECON. & STAT. 324
(2006) (concluding that roughly 60 percent of college graduates’ effect on
employment growth is due to productivity, the rest from the concentrations of skill
and growth in quality of life); Michael Storper & Allen J. Scott, Rethinking Human
Capital, Creativity and Urban Growth, 9 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 147 (2009) (arguing that
claims to the effect that consumers cities have now supplanted producer cities are
greatly exaggerated).
147
Robert W. Helsley & William C. Strange, Matching and Agglomeration Economies
in a System of Cities, 20 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 189, 189 (1990) (arguing that an
agglomeration economy in the labor market has the characteristics of a local public
good).
148
Cf. Charles J. Ten Brink, Gayborhoods: Intersections of Land Use Regulation,
Sexual Minorities, and the Creative Class, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 789, 813 (2012)
(arguing that diversity “is clearly a public good in the Tieboutian sense”).
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policies designed to attract mobile residents can interfere with the
efficiency of location choices in an agglomerative model.149 Where
mobile residents are tempted to move in response to local government
policies, this creates incentives to give up “the lost transactions
between people who would have lived near one another absent
government intervention.”150 Moreover, Tieboutian localism
empowers local land use policies that disfavor density in a way that
pushes residents further apart from each other, discouraging beneficial
local connections.151 Agglomeration economies exist beyond local
government boundaries through various positive spillovers within a
region, particularly knowledge spillovers.152 The existence of network
externalities within a region, in which cities and towns are linked by
transportation and telecommunication infrastructures that generate
and diffuse knowledge, also cuts against a strong norm of Tieboutian
localism.153
Notwithstanding the tension between agglomeration economics and
Tieboutian sorting, these two explanations are not necessarily
independent of one another. Indeed, it is more likely that they exist in
a fairly dynamic relationship. As Glaeser and Gottleib have argued,
given the difficulty of estimating and measuring human capital
externalities, even small changes in public policy can potentially have
a significant effect on agglomeration economies.154 In other words,
because agglomeration economies exist, local leaders will want to
support and foster the conditions that help to produce and sustain
them by offering the kinds of policies and amenities that are attractive
to high human capital migrants. As one commentator put it, “[a]
concentration of highly skilled workers will likely lead to the
development of amenities as much as amenities drive the
149
See Schleicher, supra note 3, at 1511-12, 1541 (explaining that “Tiebout sorting
encourages individuals and businesses to scatter, moving around a metropolitan area
away from where they would have located if local governments did not affect the
market for property”).
150
Id. at 1512.
151
See Daniel B. Rodriguez & David Schleicher, The Location Market, 19 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 637, 645-46 (2012).
152
See, e.g., Schleicher, supra note 3, at 1544 (arguing that the policies of
individual towns likely do not maximize the combined efficiency of agglomeration).
153
See Rafael Boix & Joan Trullén, Knowledge, Networks of Cities and Growth in
Regional Urban Systems, 86 PAPERS IN REGIONAL SCI. 551, 555 (2007).
154
See Glaeser & Gottlieb, Wealth of Cities, supra note 106, at 1005, 1014-15
(noting that the existence of human capital externalities does not suggest which
policies will attract such workers, but does suggest that there are costs associated with
policies that repel highly skilled workers, such as progressive taxation at the local
level).
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concentration of these same workers.”155 Even Schleicher
acknowledges that there may be a role for government policy in
helping to create the conditions for agglomeration economies,
although he argues that it is best, for efficiency reasons, to leave such
economies to the “location market.”156
Finally, although contemporary human capital theories provide
some evidence of regional-scale demand, the approach of such
theories to mobility itself may seem in tension with the animating idea
of Tiebout sorting. If people are moving for regional “amenities” or to
capture the gains from proximity and breadth that agglomeration
assumes, then they would not seem to be moving to satisfy their
preferences for a mix of public goods and tax burden.157 But the reality
is that many amenities commonly cited as motivating factors for
mobility and many of the aspects of agglomeration that emphasize the
density and diversity of inputs over immediate proximity are indirect
reflections of the kinds of public goods at the heart of the Tiebout
paradigm.158 Admittedly, there are important divergences in the
consequences of each frame — particularly the proximity strand of
agglomeration theory and traditional Tiebout sorting159 — but given
that Tiebout sought to isolate the signal of public goods from the noise
of the variety of motivations that actually drive mobility, the same
kind of simplification can provide a bridge here as well.

155
W. Mark Brown & Darren M. Scott, Human Capital Location Choice: Accounting
for Amenities and Thick Labour Markets, 52 J. REGIONAL SCI. 787, 789 (2012).
156
Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra note 151, at 639-40 (noting that governmental
policies can improve on the decisions of individuals to cluster or sort into an
agglomeration economy, but that such policies are difficult to devise given the high
gains associated with choosing where to live and the ability of individuals to negotiate
relatively effectively).
157
Tiebout, as noted, seemed to assume away motivations for residential moves at
the heart of both the amenity and agglomeration approaches. See discussion supra Part
I.A.
158
Cf. Malani, supra note 27 (discussing legal regimes as local amenities). For
example, a regression analysis of Internal Revenue Service data found that six factors
(climate variability, personal income taxes, private sector membership, housing prices,
and public schools/education) account for two-thirds of the net migration among
states from 2004–2008. Other than climate, these factors are all shaped by government
policy. See W. Michael Cox & Richard Alm, Looking for the New New World, O’NEILL
CTR. FOR GLOBAL MARKETS & FREEDOM, SMU COX SCH. OF BUS. 6, 10, 12, 17 (2010),
http://oneildocs.cox.smu. edu/annualreports/2010oneilreport.pdf.
159
See Schleicher, supra note 3, at 1511.
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III. TIEBOUTIAN REGIONALISM
The phenomenon of interregional mobility has implications for the
traditional link between Tieboutian sorting and localism. As this Part
argues, if an important aspect of intergovernmental competition for
mobile residents is regional in scale — in terms of the preferences that
residents are seeking to satisfy and the institutions that can most
appropriately respond — then the devolutionary apparatus of the
Tiebout model can be inverted to support a range of regionalist
arguments. This Part lays out these structural implications and then
revisits the primary critiques of the Tiebout model for their variance in
the context of interregional mobility. The Part concludes with
reflections on the intersection of Tieboutian regionalism and the rise
of international competition between increasingly global cities.
A. Tiebout’s Regions
1.

Regional-Scale Demand as a Rationale for Regional Governance

Contemporary patterns of interregional mobility are consonant with
the idea that people are responding to regional-scale elements of
demand as high human capital individuals increasingly sort
themselves among a handful of core cities and their metropolitan
areas. Growing regions are characterized by increases in highly skilled
knowledge workers, income levels, and housing prices that are
consistently and rapidly outpacing average national increases, due in
part to limited housing supply.160 These regions tend to have
important urban amenities attractive to highly skilled professionals
and the creative class and many have made special efforts to attract
and retain this critical subset of movers.161
That a significant strand of contemporary residential mobility is
being driven, at least in part, by demand for regional-scale public
goods implies the need for a similar conceptual frame on the supply

160
MORETTI, supra note 101, at 13-14; Glaeser & Saiz, supra note 102, at 42;
Florida, supra note 101.
161
See, e.g., Frey, Demographic Reversal, supra note 139 (based on analysis of 2010
Census data, metropolitan areas with “core primary cities” saw rapid growth; city
growth outpaced suburban growth in these areas); see also FLORIDA, RISE REVISITED,
supra note 102, at 186 (finding that economic activity is concentrated in particular
places that are growing bigger and bigger with the concentration of the creative class
and that these cities do better than others at luring creative people to their
environments by offering cultural amenties and a cultural climate that appeals to
them).
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side of the Tieboutian quasi-market.162 In other words, if the attraction
for many mobile residents is not merely the governance of an
immediate neighborhood, but rather a particular metropolitan context,
then the relevant scale of the mix of public goods, regulatory
environment, and tax burden reflected in that locational choice is in
many important respects inherently regional.163 It is thus possible to
think about regional governance as a supply-side phenomenon that
responds to the particular demand of residents whose mobility is
across metropolitan areas.164
As noted, the universe of public goods that today’s regionally mobile
residents find attractive include many types of outputs that are best
supplied at regional scale. This holds true even if such residents are
also attracted to public goods that have traditionally been thought of
162
Cf. Theodore Hershberg, The Case for Regional Cooperation, in FORMS OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT: A HANDBOOK ON CITY, COUNTY, AND REGIONAL OPTIONS 297, 297-98
(Roger L. Kemp ed., 1999) (discussing interregional economic competition as a
justification for regional cooperation).
163
Geographers and demographic scholars increasingly argue that the appropriate
scale of regionalism is not metropolitan but, to use a term that sounds like it comes
from an old science fiction movie, “megapolitan.” See ROBERT E. LANG & DAWN
DHAVALE, METROPOLITAN INSTITUTE CENSUS REPORT SERIES, BEYOND MEGALOPOLIS:
EXPLORING AMERICA’S NEW “MEGAPOLITAN” GEOGRAPHY 2 (2005); see also Margaret
Dewar & David Epstein, Planning for “Megaregions” in the United States, 22 J. PLAN.
LITERATURE 108, 110 (2007). In this view, economic, social, and environmental issues
that have traditionally been the staple of metro-scale regionalism should now be
filtered through a lens that recognizes that increasing urbanization is linking regions
that span a much larger scale, such as the southern California conurbation, a Front
Range urban area that stretches along I-25 from Cheyenne past Denver down to
Pueblo, the greater Chicagoland region, southern Florida, the northeast Acela
corridor, and a handful of others around the country. LANG & DHAVALE, supra, at 2.
It is certainly possible that the mobility-based arguments for regionalism we explore
in this Article could be applied to a level of governance one step more expansive than
the metropolitan-scale regions on which we focus. See Richard J. Cebula & Usha NairReichert, Migration and Public Policies: A Further Empirical Analysis, 36 J. ECON. & FIN.
238, 238 (2012) (finding evidence of Tieboutian sorting at the state level, with
migrants appearing to prefer lower state income tax burdens, lower state plus local
property tax burdens, and higher per pupil outlays on primary and secondary public
education). But the paradigmatic mover this Article focuses on is an individual with
greater sensitivity to local government policies than state-level policies. For present
purposes, it is sufficient to recognize the centrifugal potential of mobility and bracket
for now a fuller exploration of its application to larger-scale regions.
164
Cf. Briffault, Beyond City and Suburb, supra note 21, at 205 (“Cultural,
educational, and health institutions — museums, orchestras, universities, and
hospitals — serve their regions and play an important role in interregional
competition. Infrastructure, environmental, and natural resource issues such as
airports, transit systems, air and water quality, water supply, waste removal, and open
space transcend local boundaries and affect interregional competition as well.”).
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as local. The arts provide one example. In some regions across the
country, major arts institutions and activities are funded and
supported on a regional basis and serve as important regional markers
of cultural identity.165 Similarly, major sports stadiums are increasingly
being financed and maintained on a metropolitan regional basis.166
Regional-scale public goods also encompass regulatory choices, such
as tax incentives and economic development policies, that drive
important aspects of regional labor and housing markets, and that can
significantly influence the ecosystem in which innovation may occur.
They also include regional institutions that foster an overall climate of
growth, such as universities and regional health care facilities.
Regional policy outputs also include the facilitation of amenities such
as open space, regional transit, and other markers of the quality of
urban life across a metropolitan area that attract the kind of mobile
resident for whom many regions are competing. Though these public
goods are not necessarily inherently regional, many, if not most, have
important regional components; therefore, even where supplied by
individual local governments, these goods may still be crucial to
attract knowledgeable and creative mobile residents.167
Beyond elevating the kinds of public goods that might garner local
political attention, inter-metropolitan Tieboutian sorting can provide a
new conceptual basis for regional governance beyond the traditional
arguments well-rehearsed in the literature. Regionalism has long been

165
Some states and their metro regions, such as Missouri, Colorado, Minnesota,
Kentucky, and Washington, have created cultural asset, or overlay, districts to fund
regional scale institutions such as museums, theaters, and other cultural and civil
institutions through sales taxes and tax incentives or credits. See generally VANDERBILT
CTR. FOR NASHVILLE STUDIES, CULTURAL TAX DISTRICT: A REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF
CURRENT IMPLICATIONS (2010) (comparing cultural tax districts and non-tax
alternative models). The designated boundaries of many of these districts include the
central or core cities and the surrounding localities in the region; some were created
in response to declining tax bases due to suburban flight even as those who fled the
central city continued to use these regional assets. See Matthew Parlow, Equitable
Fiscal Regionalism, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 49, 82 (2012).
166
Parlow, supra note 165, at 83-84 (noting that Colorado, Louisiana, Arizona, and
other states have passed statutes enabling and supporting the creation of sports
stadium districts).
167
It has long been recognized that the reality of metropolitan service provision
contains strong elements of collaboration and cooperation among local governments
on some aspects of regional governance. See Elinor Ostrom & Robert B. Parks, Neither
Gargantua nor the Land of the Lilliputs: Conjectures on Mixed Systems of Metropolitan
Organization, in POLYCENTRICITY AND LOCAL PUBLIC ECONOMIES: READINGS FROM THE
WORKSHOP IN POLITICAL THEORY AND POLICY ANALYSIS 284, 285 (Michael D.McGinnis
ed., 1999).
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grounded in a series of basic propositions.168 First, regionalists argue
that economies of scale suggest that a number of public goods that
local governments now provide can be more efficiently produced at a
higher level of governance.169 Second, and closely related, is the
argument that the appropriate scale for many regulatory challenges is
inherently regional. In essence, this argument holds that when the
provision of certain goods involves regional watersheds, transportation
networks, housing markets, or similar concerns that require collective
action at a regional scale, the scope of governance should match the
scope of the regulatory concern.170 Indeed, because there is empirical
support for a strong relationship between core-city and regional
income and poverty,171 economic development policy and regulatory
authority in these areas have inherently regional aspects. Finally, for
commentators and scholars concerned with the capacity of local
governments to respond to inequity, regionalism has been a means to
overcome the artificial constraints of local government structure by
limiting a variety of welfare-enhancing transfers between localities.172
Tieboutian sorting at the level of metropolitan areas provides an
argument for regionalism that is distinct from these traditional
rationales, albeit reflecting some of the elements of the argument from
interdependence. Rather than focusing on the inherent scope of
common regional concerns, economies of scale, or communitarian or
regional equity arguments, positing a “quasi-marketplace” between
metropolitan regions privileges the shared imperative of all local
governments in a region to facilitate collective competitiveness. While
concerns of community, accountability, and efficiency might parse out
toward localism or regionalism depending on the existence of
interlocal spillovers and the like, regional-level mobility offers an
independent, direct argument for regional governance. If residents
168
See Laurie Reynolds, Local Governments and Regional Governance, 39 URB. LAW.
483, 489-90 (2007).
169
See id. at 490-91.
170
See id. at 498.
171
Manuel Pastor and his co-authors, for example, have found a negative
relationship between concentrated poverty and regional income growth. See MANUEL
PASTOR JR., PETER DREIER, J. EUGENE GRIGSBY III & MARTA LÓPEZ-GARZA, REGIONS THAT
WORK: HOW CITIES AND SUBURBS CAN GROW TOGETHER 13 (2000). Another study
examined decades of data for over 250 metropolitan statistical areas and found a
strong relationship for cities and their suburbs in terms of levels and growth of
population, income, and home values. Andrew Haughwout & Robert Inman, Should
Suburbs Help Their Central City?, BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URB. AFF. 45, 47, 55
(2002).
172
See Reynolds, supra note 168, at 493. As Professor Reynolds notes, there is also
an argument for regionalism from democratic participation grounds. Id. at 492-93.
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evaluating interregional moves are looking to, and attracted by,
regional-scale amenities and the regional ecosystem for agglomeration,
then some form of regional governance or collective action more often
than not seems necessary to provide such goods.
As a practical matter, it is more difficult to operationalize Tieboutian
regionalism to meet inter-metropolitan demand through regional-scale
public goods than traditional localism. Indeed, it is possible to
analogize the relevant regional-scale “supply” of the relevant bundles
of public goods, regulation, and taxation, which, again, may come
from multiple local governments, to the production of other outputs
that likewise require assembly. One way to think about the practical
barriers to that collective action, which is to say to some form of
regional governance, is through the lens of the so-called
“anticommons.” Michael Heller has argued that fragmentation of
rights may cause the supply of a variety of goods — public and private
— to be sub-optimal.173 According to Heller, and modeled more
formally in economics literature,174 when multiple rights holders have
the ability to block coordination, whether through the exercise of a
fractional owner’s right to exclude in property or through similar veto
powers, resources can be undersupplied.175
Although primarily focused on property law, Heller has applied this
theory to governance challenges, such as the over-proliferation of
tollbooths on the Rhine River and fragmented authority in the
issuance of urban building permits.176 The same conceptual frame can
explain why regional-scale goods are generally under-supplied in the
Tieboutian localism framework.177 Local governments in a
metropolitan region are empowered by the basic structure of state law
173
See generally MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH
OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (2008) (arguing that
fragmentation of rights may result in wasteful underuse of resources).
174
James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and
Anticommons, 43 J. L. & ECON. 1, 1 (2000); Francesco Parisi, Norbert Schulz & Ben
Depoorter, Fragmentation in Property: Towards a General Model, 159 J. INST. &
THEORETICAL ECON. 594, 594 (2003).
175
HELLER, supra note 173, at 18. As Heller notes, fragmentation of rights can also
be a beneficial source of protection for scarce resources. Id. at 67.
176
Id. at 3, 20-21, 109-10.
177
A few scholars have made this connection, albeit through the lens of the more
commonly discussed tragedy of the commons, rather than explicitly approaching
regionalism failures as an example of an anticommons. See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note
60, at 8-36 (arguing that regulatory commons problems can arise outside the common
pool resource setting). It is clearer to think of this as an anticommons problem, as
there are competing rights that operate as vetoes, if regional-scale demand is the
conceptual baseline.
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to exercise a kind of direct veto right — the right to secede from
involvement in regional-scale governance. To the extent that factors
external to the state-created structure of local governments might
suggest the need for a regional approach (and in this Article we focus
on regional-scale demand by mobile residents as one particular
external driver of governance scale), state-granted veto rights can just
as paradigmatically yield under-production as any other kind of legal
fragmentation. All of this underscores the practical challenge of
implementing a regional-scale response to comparative metropolitan
demand, but does not undermine the imperative to do so.178
2.

Interregional Localists?

One counterargument to the proposition that regional-scale mobile
demand has implications for the supply of Tieboutian bundles through
regional-scale governance is that, theoretically, it would be possible
for traditional local competition to satisfy regional demand most
optimally. Thus, even if a mobile resident is evaluating the greater
Atlanta metro area against the Miami-Dade metro region, once that
person decides to move, they still have to make an intraregional choice
of residence (and work, and school) and that traditional choice then
generates the traditional Tieboutian argument for localism.179
Moreover, people moving from one metropolitan area to another may
have an affirmative attraction to devolution itself as a public good if
they believe that their specific policy preferences are best supplied by
fragmented, relatively exclusionary local governments within the
region to which they are relocating.180
178
To be clear, our argument is not that interregional mobility undermines the
process of Tiebout sorting as it has been traditionally invoked by legal scholars.
Rather, it is that a balance must be recognized between types of mobility that
conceptually support devolution and an increasingly important strain of mobility that
can conceptually support regionalism. These are not mutually exclusive and the real
question is the balance in any given instance.
179
Indeed, there is evidence that some mobile residents move outside of their
region to find the ideal package of localized public policies, services, and taxes. See,
e.g., Martin Farnham & Purvi Sevak, State Fiscal Institutions and Empty-Nest Migration:
Are Tiebout Voters Hobbled?, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 407 (2006) (fiscal adjustment among
cross-state movers suggests that, given the opportunity, households will choose
communities that offer a tax and service bundle suited to their demands even across
state lines).
180
Cf. Malani, supra note 27 (discussing legal structures as amenities). Thus, if a
person believes that public schools operate best at the most local level, the fact that a
region has multi-jurisdictional (and particularly center-city and suburb-spanning)
school districts would be an affirmative disincentive to move to that region compared
to a region that privileged localism in schools.
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This is a serious proposition, and we are not assuming that even the
most die-hard regionalist will ignore intraregional differences when
making their ultimate locational choice.181 Indeed, once residents
decide to move to a region it is very likely that they will compare the
region’s constituent counties and municipalities to find the right
package of local goods and taxes. Notwithstanding the likelihood of
Tieboutian sorting in interregional moves, our point is that such
moves reflect a balance between the influence of purely local public
goods and the kinds of regional-scale public goods that attract
interregional movers in the first place. Both must be considered when
evaluating the structural consequences of mobility on governance.
In practice, moreover, it is very difficult to test the traditional
Tiebout hypothesis on an interregional basis without controlling for
differences in regional labor markets and regional amenities that are
not within the control of any one local government unit.182 Because
localities within a metropolitan region tend to be socially and
economically interdependent, interregional mobility patterns have an
inherent tendency to reflect regional goods and amenities. As such,
when mobile residents migrate from one region to another, it is as
important to examine the mix of regional public goods, services, and
amenities as it is to look at the particular mix of locally-bounded
public goods and services within the region.
On the supply side, it is an empirical question as well whether
regional governance is actually responding to regional demand. Unlike
Tieboutian localism, significant empirical work — direct or indirect —
has not been done on issues such as comparative capitalization rates
and the other indicia of the effect of sorting at the regional level.183
There is a second-order indication that regional sorting may have the
181
Although information costs are undoubtedly higher for residents when
Tieboutian competition is interregional, these costs have been reduced considerably
with modern technology. See, e.g., Kaplan & Schulhofer-Wohl, supra note 114
(finding costs of information about job opportunities has decreased over time,
contributing to some flattening out of interstate mobility rates between 1991 and
2011).
182
Georg Grassmueck, What Drives Intra-county Migration: The Impact of Local
Fiscal Factors on Tiebout Sorting, 41 REV. REGIONAL STUD. 119, 121-22 (2011) (citing
studies which attempt to test for Tieboutian interregional sorting and noting that
intraregional testing is more accurate because the “independence from regional labor
markets and regional natural amenities allows the researcher to focus on the
differences at the local level, such as local taxes, expenditures, housing, and schooling,
testing a Tiebout-like mechanism at work”).
183
See supra note 20 (on the empirics of Tieboutian sorting at the local level); cf.
Farnham & Sevak, supra note 179 (noting evidence of interregional local preference
satisfaction).
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same kind of impact on property valuation that local sorting seems to
have, given the comparative variation of property values among
metropolitan areas.184
Moreover, it is not entirely clear that local government officials are
necessarily aware of, or directly attending to, demand for regionalscale public goods in a Tieboutian marketplace. There is certainly
anecdotal evidence of this in explicitly regional efforts to attract
talent,185 and this has become a more important (if often implicit)
aspect of regionalism arguments in the popular literature.186 But the
logic inherent in sorting should provide an incentive for local
government officials to do just that.187
3.

Inverting Tieboutian Localism

To shift from theory to doctrine, Tieboutian regionalism has
implications for several core debates in local government law. As
noted, Tieboutian sorting has long been invoked in opposition to
regionalism in the legal literature.188 However, a Tieboutian
perspective on regional mobility, while not necessarily generating any
specific prescription for governance at a regional scale, provides a
new, and in this context, perhaps ironic, justification for a range of
supply-side governance responses to regional demand. This regionalscale supply could embrace everything from traditional metropolitan
consolidation to special-purpose regional entities, such as arts overlay
184
Cf. David Albouy & Gabriel Ehrlich, Metropolitan Land Values and Housing
Productivity 14 & tbl.2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18110,
2012), available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~albouy/ Land/l andvalues.pdf
(noting the variability in land value by metropolitan region).
185
See sources cited supra note 11.
186
See sources cited supra note 13.
187
Much of the literature on Tiebout emphasizes entrance, which is to say
attracting new residents, but in a competitive environment, governance is also
influenced by the threat of exit. Policies might theoretically vary if a region (or local
government) is trying to keep a current resident than attract a new resident, although
arguments about the kinds of environments that attract high human capital workers in
particular tend to dovetail with what keeps those people in a given place once they
relocate.
188
In the legal literature, the typical juxtaposition has been between Tieboutian
localism and regionalism. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell & Julie A. Roin, Controlling
Residential Stakes, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 143, 173 (2010) (arguing that regionalism
“diminishes the potential for useful interlocal variation and competition along the
lines suggested by the Tiebout hypothesis”); Edward J. Huck, Tiebout or Samuelson:
The 21st Century Deserves More, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 185 (2004) (contrasting Tieboutian
localism with a kind of regional consolidation approach associated with Paul
Samuelson’s work in public finance).

2013]

The Mobility Case for Regionalism

111

districts, to the kind of intraregional local cooperation that Clayton
Gillette has highlighted.189
To begin, responding to regional demand requires greater
cooperation and coordination on the regional supply side.190 As such,
interregional competition for mobile residents might justify creating
more legal room for moderating the formal aspects of state and local
government law that can stand as impediments to regional action. At
the same time, as David Barron has argued, there may be areas where
local government authority can be strengthened to foster the capacity
for regional undertakings.191 This rebalancing is a matter in the first
instance for state legislative reform, but can also play out in doctrinal
conflicts involving local government authority as well as invocations
of home-rule immunity in the face of contrary state-level directives or
preemption.192
In doctrinal areas that shape local government practice — which can
involve questions of taxation, regulatory authority, service provision,
and other staples of local government law193 — interregional
competition does not inherently undermine mobility-based arguments
for devolution. But it does provide a rationale for state-level efforts to
promote regionalism and judicial recognition of the necessity, in some
contexts, to cede local authority to regional concerns. Courts often
balance a range of normative considerations in evaluating the balance
between local government authority and efforts to moderate the
consequences of local parochialism, whether in terms of immediate
externalities or in terms of regional-scale problems.194 The dynamics of
189

See infra text accompanying notes 198-199.
See supra text accompanying notes 173-177.
191
David Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2352-62 (2003)
(discussing antidiscrimination and inclusionary zoning as examples); see also
Reynolds, supra note 168, at 524-28 (discussing ways that strengthening localism
might facilitate regionalism).
192
Cf. Barron, supra note 191, at 2367 (noting that the range of options available to
local governments “is a function not only of the powers that state law confers upon it
in isolation, but also of the powers that state law confers upon its neighbors”).
193
Among the areas where the scope of local authority — often in the face of
contrary regional-scale alternatives — is most salient are land use, education, taxation,
and the structure and operation of local governments themselves. See, e.g., Briffault,
Our Localism, supra note 2, at 346 (stating that local autonomy is critical in shaping
the law of school funding, land use, and local government formation and
preservation).
194
See, e.g., Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Process Preemption in Federal Siting Regimes, 48
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 289, 298-99 (2011) (discussing local authority over land use
regulation as a barrier to responding to regional needs); see also Nestor M. Davidson,
Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA.
190
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interregional competition may provide an additional factor for courts
to evaluate in that balance.
Tieboutian regionalism also provides an argument, albeit perhaps at
the margins, for reducing barriers to municipal annexation and for
caution when it comes to the relative ease of municipal incorporation.
The jurisprudence of local boundary setting has long been recognized
as a core ground for debates about localism,195 with legal scholars
recognizing that the legal construction of authority over city-county
consolidation, annexation, secession, dissolution, and other questions
of local government entity formation and definition play an important
role in the scale of governance.196 In all of these areas, the reality of
interregional competition for mobile residents underscores doctrines
that facilitate regional scale and impede the erection of institutional
barriers to regional governance.197
Beyond these particular legal-structural implications, regional
mobility can help facilitate collaboration by local governments within
a metropolitan area. Clayton Gillette has argued that local
governments have under-appreciated incentives to cooperate on a host
of issues.198 To Gillette, the relative lack of interlocal cooperation is
L. REV. 959, 1024 (2007) (noting that a variety of local decisions “have external effects
on neighboring communities, shaping regional economies without any imperative that
the extraterritorial consequences of local decision-making be taken into account”).
195
See, e.g., Briffault, The Local Government, supra note 3 (proposing a weakening
of the significance of local boundries coupled with the creation of regional
governments); Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in
Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841 (1994) (noting that jurists and legal scholars
simultaneously refer to local boundries as arbitrary while treating local governments
as sacrosanct entitites).
196
See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Dissolving Cities, 121 YALE L.J. 1364, 1369, 141928, 1432 (2012) (noting that municipal dissolutions, in which cities dissolve into
county structures in times of economic crisis and population loss, offer a way to
“achieve progressive modernization of local government law by reducing local
fragmentation, and, in particular, by eliminating separate governments for areas that
are too small to sustain them efficiently”).
197
Thus, interregional competition might be invoked as a ground for consolidation
or other techniques to provide platforms for scaling up or combining local
governments. It is true that there is relatively little practical support for most broadscale efforts at formal regionalism, as opposed to regional governance, but the ease or
difficulty of managing even small-scale efforts to revisit the scale of interlocal
boundaries can make a difference.
198
See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 190 (2001) [hereinafter Regionalization] (arguing that the interdependence of
localities provides an incentive to cooperate through interlocal contracts); Clayton P.
Gillette, The Conditions of Interlocal Competition, 21 J.L. & POL. 365 (2005) (arguing
that localities should be willing to work together in order to create spillover benefits
or avoid negative externalities).
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less a function of local parochialism and more a function of the high
transaction costs associated with current institutional structures,
particularly high contracting costs.199 Accepting this frame,
interregional competition may change the cost-benefit analysis that
any local government might undertake when assessing the relative
merits of interlocal cooperation versus a defection strategy, raising the
potential benefits even if not necessarily changing the costs. The
results, regardless, should be greater interlocal cooperation, all other
factors held equal.
In short, Tieboutian regionalism has implications for the entire legal
discourse on localism: it supports a version of home rule that is more
attentive to regional spillover effects, bolsters doctrines on
jurisdictional borders that make consolidation less costly (looser
annexation rules as well as lower legal barriers for small cities to
dissolve), and provides a new rationale for facilitating intraregional
bargaining and agreements that capture economies of scale.200 These
are not new doctrinal frames, but all merit revisiting through an
alternative
rationale
for
familiar
regionalist
governance
prescriptions.201
B. Revisiting the Critiques
The concerns that Tieboutian localism has drawn from a number of
scholars, both in terms of the internal operation of the model and its
consequences,202 have parallels and important disjunctions when the
mobility-governance link is regional. Some of these concerns may be
muted, but others may only be reinforced or even exacerbated in the
199

See Gillette, Regionalization, supra note 198, at 254.
Here, again, a counterargument might be offered that demand for regional
public goods by residents moving between metropolitan areas might as easily be
satisfied by traditional fragmented local governments. See supra Part III.A.2. That
there might be some interregional movers with preferences for localism, however,
does not belie the marginal consequences of those mobile residents whose balance
between local provision and regional governance implicitly (given that most people
are unlikely to make locational choices explicitly on the basis of local or regional
policies directly) tends to be more metropolitan in scale.
201
One additional point about the legal-structural consequences of Tieboutian
regionalism bears noting. Governance and mobility are inherently iterative, with
individuals and institutions responding over time to dynamics as they develop. It is
possible, then, that interregional competition could bolster a sense of shared fate by
localities, but it is also possible that local governments could respond by recalibrating
the strategies of exclusion for the realities of sorting at that scale or by pushing for
greater privatization to secede from regional governance. Cf. Fennell, supra note 62
(discussing exclusionary strategies to game Tiebout sorting).
202
See supra Part I.B.
200
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context of mobility-based regionalism. This section addresses the
extent to which concerns about the use of the Tiebout model in local
governance scale up.
1.

Internal Critiques

Critiques that focus on the basic mechanisms of Tiebout sorting,
such as the implausibility of mobility actually changing the political
process, the information barriers to “consumer-voting,” and the like,
at first blush seem equally likely to hold for regional-scale locational
choices as they do for a localist quasi-marketplace.203 There are
certainly aspects of regional-scale mobility that may render the model
less plausible at an interregional scale. For example, interregional
moves arguably entail much higher information costs compared to
interlocal moves, making the ability to sort based on public goods less
plausible. An argument for the centrifugal force of interregional
mobility is thus not likely to convince scholars inclined to argue that
the noise of alternative motivations for locational choices will drown
out the signal offered by the bundle of public goods. And the reality
that, absent full regional consolidation, the link between governance
and place is inherently more attenuated in the institutional structure
of regionalism makes the argument about political mechanisms for
responding to mobility more challenging in the interregional context.
We acknowledge these additional complications to the model, but
still argue that the basic mechanism can translate to regional scale.
Our aim here is not to plow new conceptual ground about the
processes underlying the influence of mobility on governance, many of
which are strained at the purely local level to begin with. Rather, we
assume for the sake of argument that the basic conceptual framework
has merit (and, if nothing else, it certainly has great influence).
Accordingly, we accept that the mechanics are sufficiently similar —
even for the differences in degree on some measures of how mobility
influences governance — but vary the model’s assumptions about the
scale of the demand for and supply of public goods and their resulting
prescriptions.
2.

Consequentialist Critiques

As to the more pernicious consequences of mobility’s influence on
governance itself, a Tieboutian perspective on regionalism has the
potential to both mute and exacerbate disparate elements of the
203

See supra Part I.B.1.
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distributional and the commodification concerns.204 To begin, it is
possible that regional mobility’s counterbalance to the devolutionary
tendencies of the traditional mobility paradigm might mitigate the
dynamics of regional inequity. The argument would be that the more
regional mobility reinforces regional identity and shared governance,
the stronger the incentive to recognize the shared fate of disparate
communities in a given region, and the greater the likelihood of
recognizing that regional inequality is a drag on regional growth.
Further, it appears that policies that promote sustainability and
regional equity are themselves selling points for “creative class”
knowledge workers attracted to regions of relative cultural
tolerance.205 This dynamic can thus reinforce local policies that seek to
respond to regional inequality. Because interlocal collaboration has the
potential to resolve fiscal disparities and other intraregional inequities,
the openness of the creative class to viewing more equitable regional
policies as in the region’s collective best-interest has the potential to
disrupt “the nativism amongst residents of [discrete geographic
communities] that precludes the pursuit of cross-border political
alliances.”206
At the same time, intraregional disparities may be exacerbated if
interregionally mobile residents care most about cherry-picking a
region’s advantages. This harkens back to the concern that
interregional movers may revert to traditional Tieboutian sorting once
inside the region. That is, mobile residents may end up choosing one
metropolitan region over another because of its collective advantages,
but then make second-order intraregional locational decisions based
on factors that replicate the current dynamics that have given rise to
the inequitable patterns existing in many regions today. It is difficult
to determine empirically which of these two outcomes is more likely
to occur and we admit to misgivings about the ability of any model
based on a quasi-market sorting mechanism to solve the very
distributional problems that it creates. Nevertheless, intuitively,
regional-scale mobility can at least offer a counterweight to the more
parochial aspects of localism by fostering a sense of common destiny
among disparate interests linked by a concern for overall regional
health and competitiveness.
Taking a step back, interregional sorting may also replicate the
kinds of spatial distributional problems associated with Tieboutian
204

See supra Part I.B.2.
See supra text accompanying notes 125-127.
206
Lisa Alexander, The Promise and Perils of “New Regionalist” Approaches to
Sustainable Communities, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 640 (2011).
205
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localism, but instead among metropolitan regions rather than within
them, like fractals that replicate structures at varying scales.207 There is
some evidence that metropolitan regions are, in fact, developing at
rates that suggest a kind of regional-scale tiering.208 The industrial
midwest, for example, has regions that, as a whole, are shrinking and
losing not just populace, but also economic and governmental
resources; while regions in the south, southwest, and northeast have
seen relatively greater growth, even through the downturn.209 This
risks a kind of “favored quarter” at an interregional rather than
interlocal level — all the more so because contemporary mobility
between metropolitan areas is dominated by highly skilled people with
high human capital.
In terms of commodification, regional mobility does not mitigate —
and arguably reinforces — the concern that mobility paradigms reduce
local governance too much to a transactional emphasis on returns on
investment rather than shared community. Concerns about the risks
posed by an emphasis on intergovernmental competition and marketlike mechanisms for governance could easily be replicated at the
regional scale. Indeed, the focus of regional entities or collaborations
on targeting mobile knowledge workers in order to stimulate
innovation-related growth is arguably just a modern twist on the kind
of governance-as-marketplace that has concerned so many legal
scholars about the Tiebout model’s influence on the nature of local
government.210 The fact, moreover, that local governments are
competing less for traditional industrial and blue-collar industrial
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goods and more for high human capital workers, regardless of scale,
carries a particular risk of commodification that makes it hard for
certain “consumers” in the market for local public goods to influence
governance.
On the other hand, even if mobile innovators are particularly
“market” oriented in their response to locational choice, there is an
argument that the kinds of regional-scale policies that are thought to
attract these particular residents may have spillover effects that
reinforce, rather than undermine, community character and livability.
As noted, regional-scale amenities such as vibrant cultural
environments, tolerant and racially diverse local cultures, and
ecosystems of innovation seem to be attractive to the most prominent
of interregional mobile residents.211 These may, in turn, generate
greater civic engagement, as people across a region have more
opportunities to engage across sub-communities and interact in public
spaces and environments that foster common identity and purpose.212
C. Coda: Regional Mobility in a World of Global Cities
To this point, our discussion has focused on the reality that the
metropolitan regional scale in the United States is an important locus
for interjurisdictional competition for mobile residents. But the
contest for human capital is also increasingly occurring among
metropolitan regions internationally.213
Saskia Sassen has persuasively argued that the world economy has
given rise to the dominance of “global cities,” which she defines not
simply as particularly large or important cities, but rather as
interconnected nodes of post-industrial economic activity.214 Sassen
describes a contemporary economic system that is “spatially dispersed,
yet globally integrated,”215 with a core of large cities (and the metro
regions in which they exist) increasingly serving as points of economic
concentration, particularly in high human capital sectors such as
finance.216 Sassen focused on three examples — New York, London,
and Tokyo (she was originally writing in 1991) — but the
211
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phenomenon she describes applies today to a large array of urban
regions, including those in rapidly urbanizing areas of China, India,
Brazil, and other similar developing nations.217
The post-industrial, interconnected urban order that Sassen
describes reflects and magnifies the kind of metropolitan interregional
competition that is occurring domestically.218 Greater New York (or
Chicagoland, or the San Francisco Bay Area, or really most of the
larger metropolitan regions in the United States) now have to pay
attention to comparisons in metropolitan financial markets, urban
planning, housing conditions, school quality, and amenities in
Shanghai, Bangalore, Sao Paolo, Tel Aviv, and similar interconnected
economic areas around the world that, even in the current global
downturn, are still booming.219
If the world is moving to a global economy increasingly driven by
knowledge workers competing at the metropolitan level against other
metro-level engines of innovation,220 then competition for this global
talent lends further support to inversion of the devolutionary
prescriptions of the traditional Tieboutian paradigm.221 Gerald Frug
217
See The Global Cities Index 2010, FOREIGN POLICY (AUG. 16, 2010), http://
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/08/11/the_global_cities_index_2010 (examining
sixty-five metropolises around the world for their “influence on and integration with
global markets, culture, and innovation”).
218
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Talent, 120 YALE L.J. 2088, 2090 (2011) (same).
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(explicitly) competition. See Patricia McCarney, Cities and Prosperity Series No.1, GLOBAL
CITY INDICATORS FACILITY (Feb. 2012), http://www.cityindicators.org/Deliverables/
GCIF%20Cities%20and%20Prosperity%20Report%20E1(S)Final_4-24-2013-1213456.pdf
(noting that it “developed a standardized methodology for collecting data on a
comprehensive set of indicators, many of which shed light on a variety of factors that can
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and David Barron have argued that state law — by alternately granting
and limiting local authority — distorts the ability of cities such as New
York that might be inclined to compete with other global cities.222 The
same argument can pertain to regional-scale governance, perhaps even
more clearly given the muddle that currently attends to legal authority
for regional efforts and the tradition and history of localism.
The legal-structural consequences of the proliferation of global cities
as drivers of economic growth — and participants in the competition
for mobile human capital — in turn suggests other pathways for future
research. For example, global competition at a metropolitan regional
scale may have implications not only for local government law, but
also for immigration. In a recent, provocative proposal, the economist
Brandon Fuller made the argument for city-based visas.223 As Fuller
noted, localities have different preferences — a Tieboutian argument
— for increased immigration, and those that prefer to attract
immigrants could be given a certain number of visas from the
Department of Homeland Security to enable them to sponsor visa
holders and their families.224 The sponsoring localities would be
responsible for the immigrants (to allay concerns — however
irrational — about immigrants taking advantage of transfer programs
and increasing crime) and this could create a path to citizenship.225
This is not to endorse the proposal, which raises concerns about risks
to national uniformity, but simply to note that a global perspective on
interregional competition may have intriguing legal consequences.
CONCLUSION: THE VIEW FROM TIEBOUT’S BEACH
Over sixty years ago, Charles Tiebout described a simple beach as
the paradigm example of a local amenity that might be important in
the quasi-market for mobile residents in which he imagined local
interregional competition — nationally and globally — could still be considered
somewhat devolutionary, in the sense that the theory privileges metropolitan scale and
hence regional governance, rather than, for example, state-level or national
policymaking. Cf. Pettys, supra note 2 (discussing arguments for national-level
lawmaking in the face of mobility). The theory thus invokes mobility to situate
policymaking at a relatively low level in the federalism hierarchy, although some
metropolitan areas are functionally larger than some states.
222
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223
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governments competing.226 In an era of regional mobility between
metropolitan areas across the country — and, for some residents,
around the world — the view from Tiebout’s beach now looks very
different. Today, public officials in metropolitan areas are increasingly
realizing that they share a common fate, not for the traditional reasons
that regionalists have long proffered for collaboration, but because
they are increasingly aware of the reality of competition between
regions for human capital. Concerns about equity and the signals that
a marketplace metaphor holds for governance remain as valid as ever,
if not more so. But there is no avoiding the reality that for many
mobile residents, their locational choice is informed materially by the
comparative merits of regional networks and regulatory environments,
regional amenities, and regional job, housing, and investment
ecosystems. Local governments ignore this reality at their peril, as do
scholars who continue to associate Tieboutian sorting entirely with
devolution and decentralization.
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